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Paradoxical Perils of the
Precautionary Principle
Frank B. Cross*
Few principles are better ensconced in the law and philosophy of envir-
onmentalism than is the "precautionary principle." The precautionary prin-
ciple simply reflects the classic adage: Better safe than sorry. The principle
suggests that government should take precautions to protect public health and
the environment, even in the absence of clear evidence of harm and notwith-
standing the costs of such action. I The appeal of the principle makes it a
candidate for consensus, among a public otherwise deeply divided about en-
vironmental policies.' The precautionary principle is not only a mantra of
the green movement but also is fundamentally appealing to the "anxious
millions who think it might often be better to be safe than sorry."3 The
theory can be traced back to Rachel Carson's Silent Spring, the environmen-
talist bible that warned against human tampering with nature with particular
reference to pesticides. 4 Yet in this Article I will maintain that the precau-
* Professor of Business Regulation, University of Texas at Austin.
1. See, e.g., Gregory D. Fullem, The Precautionary Principle: Environmental Protec-
tion in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty, 31 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 495, 497-98 (1995)
(reporting that "the principle asserts that regulators and decision makers should act in anticipa-
tion of environmental harm, without regard to the certainty of the scientific information
pertaining to the risk of harm"); Lothar Gundling, The Status in International Law of the
Principle of Precautionary Action, 5 INT'L J. ESTUARINE & COASTAL L. 23, 26 (1990)
(declaring that precautionary principle "requires action even if risks are not yet certain but only
probable, or, even less, not excluded").
2. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Facing a Time of Counter-Revolution - The Kepone
Incident and a Review of First Principles, 29 U. RICH. L. REv. 657, 695 (1995); see also
Fullem, supra note 1, at 499 (referring to "growing espousal of the principle by policy makers,
scientists, and legal commentators alike"); id. at 500 (observing that "the precautionary
principle is being incorporated into environmental law and policy at an ever-escalating rate").
3. Environmentalism: Risking the Earth, ECONOMIST, Sept. 16, 1995, at 99; see also
Bradford C. Mank, Superfund Contractors and Agency Capture, 2 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 34,
80 (1993) (observing that "the public generally chooses to err on the side of safety"); Amy
Montemarano, The Delaney Paradox Resurfaces: Regulating Pesticides as Food Additives under
Federal Law, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 433, 455 (1994) (suggesting that it "is far better to err on the
side of safety than to 'force the public to play Russian roulette each time it eats"').
4. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, From the Beginning, a Fundamental Shift of Paradigms:
A Theory and Short History of Environmental Law, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 981, 1000 (1994)
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tionary principle is deeply perverse in its implications for the environment
and human welfare.
Under different names, the precepts of the precautionary principle con-
sistently reappear in environmental policy. For example, some have com-
pared the risk of scientific false positives in environmental law (costing
money) with the cost of scientific false negatives (costing lives) and argued
that the greater consequences of false negatives mean that scientific uncer-
tainty should become a basis for environmental protection regulation or other
governmental action.' The classic formulation of this principle was produced
by Talbot Page in 1978.6 He suggested that a false negative could cost lives,
while a false positive, such as banning a truly harmless chemical, would have
only economic consequences, and probably minor ones at that.7 Given the
asymmetry in the consequences of error, Page urged that we err on the side
of preventing false negatives at the expense of some false positives. Yet his
claimed asymmetry of consequences was essentially asserted without proof.
(tracing precautionary principle as outgrowth of Rachel Carson's paradigm). The origin of
the phrase apparently lies in a 1965 committee of German administrators. Alex Milne, The
Perils of Green Pessimism, NEW SCIENTIST, June 12, 1993, at 34. Ms. Carson's text
remains compelling today, though "nothing Carson forecast in Silent Spring came to pass."
GREGG EASTERBROOK, A MOMENT ON THE EARTH 80 (1995). Indeed, "the unintentional
harm arising from the activities of environmental alarmists" has been called "Carsonogenic
harm." William M. London, Priorities, Dollars and Sense, 7:4 PRIORITIES 3, 4 (1995).
5. See Sidney Shapiro, Keeping the Baby and Throwing Out the Bathwater" Justice
Breyer's Critique of Regulation, 8 ADMIN. L.J. 721, 732 (1995) (discussing uncertainty in
regulatory decisionmaking). Shapiro argues:
When a regulator makes a decision under conditions of uncertainty, there are two
possible types of error. The regulator can overregulate a risk that turns out to
be insignificant or the regulator can underregulate a risk that turns out to be
significant. If the regulator erroneously underregulates, the burden of this
mistake falls on those individuals who are injured or killed, and their families.
If a regulator erroneously overregulates, the burden of this mistake falls on the
regulated industry which will pay for regulation that is not needed. This result,
however, is fairer than setting the burden of uncertainty about a risk on potential
victims.
Id. at 732; see also Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative
Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 562, 641 (1992) (suggesting that
"the danger of false positives ... [is] far less serious than the danger of false negatives").
6. Talbot Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 207 (1978).
7. Id. at 219-20.
8. See Frank B. Cross, The Public Role in Risk Control, 24 ENVTL. L. 887, 941
(1994) (discussing basis and effects of precautionary principle). I wrote that:
It is often asserted that in environmental regulation it is better to risk false
positives (unnecessary regulation) than false negatives (failure to regulate actual
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Another manifestation of the precautionary principle is found in the
suggestion that new chemicals and other human activities should bear the
burden of proof before they are allowed.' As espoused by some, the precau-
tionary principle requires "proof of harmlessness" before an activity is
allowed.'0 The burden shifting is applied in California's Proposition 65
requirements of warning." This concept also appears strongly in the United
Nations' World Charter for Nature, which declares that when "potential
adverse effects are not fully understood, the activities should not proceed."' 2
problems). It is thought that a false negative may be catastrophic, while a false
positive will only waste a little money. In fact, false positives may present a
much greater threat to health than false negatives.
Id. The primary point of the present Article is to demonstrate this fact.
9. See Brian Wynee & Sue Mayer, How Science Fails the Environment, NEW
SCIENTIST, June 5, 1993, at 32 (declaiming that "precautionary principle demands that the
environment must not be left to show harm before action is taken," so the "burden of proof
is shifted from those seeking to protect the environment to the polluter"); see also Alana M.
Fuierer, The Anti-Chlorine Campaign in the Great Lakes: Should Chlorinated Compounds
Be Guilty Until Proven Innocent, 43 BuFF. L. REv. 181 (1995).
10. See Milne, supra note 4 (discussing difficulty in proving negative). This estab-
lishes quite a high standard, as the author elaborates:
Wittgenstein and Bertrand Russell once sat on a couch together and tried to prove
that there was not a hippopotamus in the room. In the end they had to get down
on their knees and look under the sofa. . . . If Wittgenstein and Russell cannot
do it without effort, it is because it cannot be done, and no scientist has ever
wasted a minute in the attempt.
Id. It is a scientific aphorism that you cannot prove a negative. See, e.g., Junius C.
McElveen, Jr. & Chris Amantea, Legislating Risk Assessment, 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 1553,
1561 (1995) (observing that if "the burden of proof is put on the party alleging that the
chemical is safe - that it presents no risk - that party will lose, because their is no way
to prove a negative").
11. See William S. Pease, Identifying Chemical Hazards for Regulation: The Scientific
Basis and Regulatory Scope of California's Proposition 65 List of Carcinogens and Repro-
ductive Toxicants, 3 RiSK 127 (1992). Pease observes:
Proposition 65 shifts the burden of proof in the regulatory process from govern-
ment to industry. Use of chemicals known to cause cancer or reproductive
toxicity is no longer considered "innocent" until proven "guilty" of harming
public health by governmental agencies .... Exemptions from these require-
ments are allowed only if the business responsible for an exposure or discharge
can demonstrate that the amount of chemical in question poses "no significant
risk."
Id. at 127-28.
12. World Charter for Nature, G.A. Res. 37/7, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No.
51, at section (ll)(11)(b), U.N. Doc. A/Res/37/7 (1992), reprinted in 22 INT'L LEGAL
MATERiALs 455, 458 (1983).
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Environmentalists' disdain for scientific evidence has been justified on the
grounds that it nudges society toward such a shift in the burden of proof. 3
The precautionary principle has recently assumed added prominence
with the growth of international environmental concern. The 1992 Rio
Declaration of the U.N. Conference on the Environment explicitly declared
that "[iun order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall
be widely applied by States according to their capabilities." 1 4 Some "ex-
press statement of a precautionary principle is found in the Treaty of Rome,
as amended by the Treaty on European Union, as well as in other interna-
tional instruments adopted in the intervening twenty years. "5 The principle
is prominent in international consideration of policies regarding climate
change. 6 The precautionary principle has become linked with the funda-
mental international principle of sustainable development.' Precaution is
"rapidly assuming a central role in international environmental law."' 8 The
13. See Sylvia N. Tesh, Environmentalism, Pre-Environmentalism, and Public Policy,
26 POL'Y SCI. 1, 15 (1993) (claiming that "grassroots environmental groups, by attributing
their diseases to pollution regardless of the scientific evidence, will continue to reflect and
promote environmental principles, edging the movement along").
14. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, June 14, 1992, Principle 15, reprinted in 31 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 874, 879 (1992). The Principle states that "lack of full scientific certainty"
shall not serve as a barrier to environmental regulation. Id.
15. David A. Wirth, The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development: Two Steps
Forward and One Back, or Vice Versa?, 29 GA. L. REv. 599, 634 (1995). The author
further notes that "[e]laboration of the principle has occurred with special particularity in
the context of marine pollution," and that "[plrecautionary approaches have also received
considerable attention in the policy debate on global climate change." See also James E.
Hickey, Jr. & Vern R. Walker, Refining the Precautionary Principle in International
Environmental Law, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 42 (1995). At a recent conference of European
environmental ministers on hazardous substances, the chemical industry argued that regula-
tion should be grounded in risk assessment, but the ministers chose instead to rely upon the
precautionary principle. See Ministers Target Near-Zero Emissions, Stand Firm on Mercury
Cell Phaseout, CHEM. WEEK, June 21, 1995, at 15.
16. See Fullem, supra note 1, at 504 (finding that "[i]nternational delegates confronting
the issue of global warming have also embraced the precautionary approach"); see also supra
notes 14-15 (discussing international community's embrace of precautionary principle).
17. See Richard B. Howarth, Sustainability Under Uncertainty: A Deontological
Approach, 71 LAND ECON. 417 (1995). This article provides an unusually rigorous defense
of the precautionary principle, both philosophically and through economic modeling.
18. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Precaution, Participation, and the "Greening" of Interna-
tional Trade Law, 7 J. ENVTL. L. & LMG. 57, 60 (1992). The author catalogues a number
of treaties and international conferences that have embraced the precautionary principle. Id.
at 60-62; see also Fullem, supra note 1, at 502-08; Gundling, supra note 1; Plater, supra
note 2, at 1000 n.73 (reporting that precautionary principle has become "major international
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principle may have significant protectionist repercussions for world trade. 19
Aspects of the precautionary principle pervade domestic environmental
and public health law as well. The Delaney Clause, which prohibits all
food additives that have been shown to induce cancer in any animal species,
is but one prominent example.' Under the Clause, it matters not that the
animal test is a poor surrogate for human risk or that the human risk is
miniscule."' Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval conditions for
new drugs reflect Page's fear of false negative errors.' In fact, the concept
of "margin of safety" is found throughout our environmental laws.' The
meaning of margin of safety for a non-threshold pollutant is murky, but the
concept clearly embraces the precautionary principle's devotion to erring
on the side of safety. The feasibility-based standards found elsewhere in
environmental law likewise represent a reflection of the precautionary prin-
ciple.24 The Superfund process is even structurally designed to emphasize
policy norm"); Bernard A. Weintraub, Science, International Environmental Regulation, and
the Precautionary Principle: Setting Standards and Defining Terms, 1 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J.
173 (1992).
19. See Don Mayer & David Hoch, International Environmental Protection and the
GATT: The Tuna/Dolphin Controversy, 31 AM. Bus. L.J. 187, 234-35 (1993) (citing
conflicts between precautionary principle and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT)); Roht-Arriaza, supra note 18, at 62 (describing how GATT "violates . . .the
precautionary approach").
20. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1994).
21. See Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1992) (stressing that Delaney Clause
must be interpreted literally, without regard to conceptions of sensible policymaking), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1361 (1993). This decision has been criticized as a misuse of the
precautionary principle, as the "court's strict interpretation of the clause may cause greater
harm to public health than the risk posed by the negligibly carcinogenic pesticides at issue
in the case." Douglas T. Sheehy, A De Minimis Exception to the Delaney Clause: A
Reassessment of Les v. Reilly, 50 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 257, 258 (1995).
22. See HENRY GRABOwsKI & JOHN VERNON, THE REGULATION OF PHARMACEU-
TICALS: BALANCING THE BENEFITS AND RISKS 10 (1983) (declaring that "mandate to the
FDA is drawn in very narrow terms - to protect consumers against unsafe or ineffective
drugs (that is, to avoid type-2 [false negative] errors)" with "no corresponding mandate to
avoid type-1 [false positive] errors or to compel equal concern with new drug innovation
and improved medical therapy").
23. The National Ambient Air Quality Standards are to be set "allowing an adequate
margin of safety." 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1994). Standards for hazardous air pollutants
are to provide an "ample margin of safety." Id. § 7412(b). Water pollution standards
for toxic pollutants likewise are to provide an "ample margin of safety." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1317(a)(4) (1994).
24. See Kenneth M. Murchison, Environmental Law in Australia and the United States:
A Comparative Approach, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AiF. L. Rsv. 503, 530 (1995) (noting that feasi-
bility-based standards are consistent with precautionary principle and that such standards are
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the precautionary principle.' Aaron Wildavsky observed that the "canon
of 'decide in favor of safety,' sometimes known as the 'precautionary prin-
ciple,' pervades analysis and action in all risk issues. "I
The courts also have uncritically embraced the precautionary principle.
Perhaps the first critical circuit court opinion under the Clean Air Act em-
phasized the need (and "common sense") of taking affirmative action in the
presence of uncertainty about environmental effects.27 In a decision reject-
ing the use of cost or technological feasibility considerations in setting Na-
tional Ambient Air Quality Standards, the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit stressed that the objective of the Clean
Air Act was "to err on the side of caution. "I Even in the Supreme Court's
Benzene decision, a setback for the Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration's effort to rely on the precautionary principle, the Court empha-
sized that risk assessment for hazardous substances "is free to use conserva-
tive assumptions in interpreting the data with respect to carcinogens, risking
error on the side of overprotection rather than underprotection. "29
Agencies administering environmental and public health laws have
responded to these directions and have applied the precautionary principle
in rulemaking. The cautionary statutory directions are probably unneces-
sary because precaution is induced by structural incentives within the bur-
eaucracy itself.3" For whatever reason, "agency estimates of health risks
found in Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act).
25. See Mank, supra note 3, at 80 (1993) (reporting that "[sltructural incentives within
the Superfund process seem to encourage EPA to require more protective approaches: it is the
PRPs that are supposed to pay, and the public generally chooses to err on the side of safety").
26. AARON WILDAVSKY, BUT IS IT TRUE? 8 (1995).
27. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 24-25 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941
(1976).
28. Lead'Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1155 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1042 (1980).
29. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 656
(1980) (plurality opinion).
30. See Sam Kazman, Deadly Overcaution: FDA's Drug Approval Process, 1 J. REG. &
Soc. COSTS 31, 36 (1990) [hereinafter Kazman, Deadly Overcaution] (observing that overcau-
tion is "a problem that is inherent in the agency's political nature," because administrators are
more likely to be sanctioned for false negative than false positive). Former FDA Commis-
sioner Alexander Schmidt stated that throughout all of FDA's history he was "unable to find
a single instance where a congressional committee investigated the failure of FDA to approve
a new drug," while hearings to criticize such an approval were "so frequent that we aren't able
to count them." Id. at 37. He concluded that the congressional pressure for disapproval was
"intense." Id.; see also STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 41 (1993) (observ-
ing that "hearings are far more likely to mean criticism for leniency than for strictness"). A
survey of "dozens of oversight hearings on health and safety" found that "all but four featured
856
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tend to be worst-case or upper bound.""' The Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) incorporates a number of conservative assumptions in its
assessment of risks.3 2 A recent survey referred to how "most regulatory
attempts to standardize assessment methods have introduced several levels
of conservatism because such assessments have, for the sake of public
safety, been structured to over-estimate true risks" and cited ten recent
scientific articles to this effect.33 While risk assessments are commonly
criticized as overly conservative, defenders of the prevailing assessment
methods have risen to claim that the EPA's methods overstate risk by only
seven times.3" The D.C. Circuit recently took note of the EPA's "blanket,
highly conservative assumptions" in regulation.3
When agencies extrapolate from animal tests in carcinogen risk assess-
ments, they may overstate the true risk of human health by a factor of more
than 100 and perhaps as much as infinity. 6 While much of the discussion
criticisms that agencies had been too lax." R. Shep Melnick, The Politics of Benefit-Cost
Analysis, in VALUING HEALTH RISKS, COSTS, AND BENEFITS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION
MAKING 23, 32 (P. Brett Hammond & Rob Coppock eds., 1990). "One FDA official
remarked that no one was going to blame him for slow approval of a beneficial drug, but he
would be blamed for approving the next thalidomide." W. KIP VIscusI, FATAL TRADE-OFFS
273 (1992). These incentives to caution are supplemented by the innate interest of agencies
in enhancing their political power. See Sam Kazman, Death by Regulation, REGULATION,
Fall 1991, at 18, 18 [hereinafter Kazman, Death by Regulation] (observing that government
agencies will act to increase their influence "even when increased political power comes at the
direct expense of the public safety the agency is charged with promoting").
31. DANIEL J. FIORiNO, MAKING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 113 (1995).
32. See EPA Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992,
33,993-94 (1986) (discussing basis for EPA's guidelines for carcinogen risk assessment).
33. Dennis J. Paustenbach, Retrospective on U.S. Health Risk Assessment: How Others
Can Benefit, 6 RISK 283, 287 & n.17 (1995).
34. Adam M. Finkel, A Second Opinion on an Environmental Misdiagnosis: The Risky
Prescriptions of Breaking the Vicious Circle, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. REV. 295, 349 (1995).
Finkel has been the leading legal respondent to the claim that risk assessment is overly
conservative. See, e.g., Adam M. Finkel, Is Risk Assessment Really Too Conservative?
Revising the Revisionists, 14 COLUM. J. EN 'rL. L. 427 (1989). A factor of seven is far less
than the claims of a thousand-fold overestimation of risk, but a seven-fold overestimation
is nonetheless quite significant.
35. Leather Indus. of Am., Inc. v. EPA, 40 F.3d 392, 403 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
36. Philip H. Abelson, Commentary: Exaggerated Risks of Chemicals, 48 J. CLINICAL
EPIDEMIOLOGY 173, 175 (1995). Abelson, a former president of the National Academy of
Sciences (NAS), catalogues many of the features that cause overestimation of risk, including
the use of inbred animal subjects, the application of maximum tolerated doses, the assump-
tion that rate and mode of administration do not matter, and the failure to consider
pharmacokinetic differences among species. Id. at 174-77. Similar criticisms can be found
in Dennis J. Paustenbach, Health Risk Assessment: Opportunities and Pitfalls, 14 COLUM. J.
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of risk assessment's conservatism focuses on extrapolation from animal stud-
ies,37 the most remarkable precaution often exists in exposure assessments.
These may presume the existence of "naked, dirt-eating farmers" near waste
sites38 or children who consume remarkable quantities of dirt.39
When setting standards for Superfund cleanups, very conservative as-
sumptions are common, driving remediation to extensive measures. 40 As is
the case with regulatory actions, the EPA uses "far-fetched exposure scenar-
ios" to increase the apparent risk.41 The agency confesses that its carcinogen
profiles for risk calculation provide "an upper bound estimate of cancer
risks."42 At one site, the government insisted that the ground "be sufficiently
clean that a person could consume six teaspoonsful of its soil every year for
70 years without risk. "I
ENVTL. L. 379 (1989). Stephen Breyer likewise noted that risk assessments "overstate risks
by factors of a thousand or even a million or more." BREYER, supra note 30, at 47.
37. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT 14 (Apr. 1, 1990 - Mar. 31, 1991) (complaining of excessive conserva-
tism in agency risk assessments and focusing on several conservative assumptions in conduct
of animal bioassays and extrapolation of those studies to humans).
38. John S. Applegate, A Beginning and Not an End in Itself: The Role of Risk Assess-
ment in Environmental Decision-Making, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1643, 1654 (1995). The
exposure model used for risk assessment at a waste site near Cincinnati calculated the risk for
a resident farmer who has full-body exposure to the soil plus some incidental consumption of
soil. The author drolly notes that "such individuals are a rarity in southwestern Ohio," but
explains that the assessment assumption was used "precisely because its conservatism provided
a margin of safety." Id.
39. See BREYER, supra note 30, at 12 (referring to waste site where millions of dollars
were spent to protect "non-existent dirt-eating children"). A recent risk assessment for
municipal waste incinerators assumed that a "child could eat as much as about one small spoon-
ful of dirt each day, that his house was down-wind of the stack, that he ate fish from a pond
near the incinerator, that his fish consumption was at the 95th percentile level, that he drank
contaminated water from the pond, that he ate food grown primarily from the family garden,
and that he drank milk from a cow which grazed on forage at the farm." Paustenbach, supra
note 33, at 310. The assessment also assumed that he did so for his entire seventy year life.
Id.
40. The director of the Center for Disease Control's Center for Environmental Health
blamed the EPA's "exaggerated risk models" for the costly and disruptive relocation of those
living near the Superfund site at Times Beach, Missouri, though subsequent evidence demon-
strated that little risk was present. WILDAVSKY, supra note 26, at 122.
41. Id. at 167; see also id. at 168 (quoting EPA assessment manual which directs
assumption that "exposure occurs 24 hours per day for the entire period that contamination is
present").
42. Id. at 170. A study of several cleanup actions found that "[i]n each instance this
worst-case conception of risk guided EPA decisions about the degree of cleanup necessary."
Id. at 184.
43. EASTERBROOK, supra note 4, at 603.
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The concept of the precautionary principle has received very little criti-
cism, perhaps because it is presented as a matter of simple common sense.'
What criticism exists takes the principle's advocates to task for ignoring the
monetary costs of environmental regulation. The critics thus object that the
"flaw in such playing-it-safe is that it replaces environmental risk with risks
to jobs and wealth, which environmentalists often loftily ignore."4 The
critics typically emphasize the financial costs attendant to embracing the pre-
cautionary principle.
While there is a measure of truth in the economic disapproval of reli-
ance upon the precautionary principle, the criticism grounded in cost consid-
eration is limited and rhetorically quite unpersuasive. The appealing under-
pinning of the precautionary principle is the belief that economic gain should
not justify taking risks with public health and safety or general environmental
welfare. Juxtaposed against human life and health, dollars seem relatively
unimportant. Even the critics of the precautionary principle thus have
allowed the debate to be framed in terms very favorable to the principle. As
Wildavsky notes:
The precautionary principle is a marvelous piece of rhetoric. It places
the speaker on the side of the citizen - I am acting for your health -
and portrays opponents of the contemplated ban or regulation as indiffer-
ent or hostile to the public's health .... The rhetoric seems to present
a choice between health and money or even suggest health with no loss
whatsoever, for a tangential presumption is that industry will find a better
and a cheaper as well as safe way.'
Rhetorical appeal, however, is not the same as wisdom.
The precautionary principle can be attacked as an uncertain decision
rule.47 The truly fatal flaw of the precautionary principle, ignored by almost
44. See Fullem, supra note 1, at 521 (reporting "inexorabl[e] link" between "[c]om-
mon sense and the precautionary principle"). This stands in contrast to science, which
requires proof and "is not a common-sense activity." Milne, supra note 4.
45. Environmentalism Runs Riot, ECONOMIST, Aug. 8, 1992, at 11.
46. WILDAvsKY, supra note 26, at 428.
47. If uncertainty justifies regulation, there remains the question of how much regula-
tion should ensue. The precautionary principle seems to call for the elimination of uncer-
tainty, reducing any risk to zero. Yet a zero risk approach is both functionally impossible
and practically disastrous. See FRANK B. CROS, ENVIRONMENTALLY INDUCED CANCER
AND THE LAw 70-73 (1989) (discussing how pursuit of zero risk is economically disastrous,
physically impossible, and politically counterproductive). If the zero risk approach is not
adopted, as it cannot be, the precautionary principle does not tell us how much uncertainty
or risk should be allowed by a regulation. For this same reason, the approach cannot state
that a given, uncertain risk rises to the level that would warrant regulation. Some of the
adverse consequences of this effect are discussed below in Section H(A).
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all the commentators, is the unsupported presumption that an action aimed
at public health protection cannot possibly have negative effects on public
health.4" Yet these unanticipated adverse effects are demonstrably common,
as illustrated below. Because the precautionary principle counsels for action
against even those uncertain hazards that might be nonexistent, the presence
of real adverse health effects consequent to that action means that the regula-
tion will often cause more health harm than good.49 H.W. Lewis refers to
this as the "delusion of conservatism" and notes that efforts to strengthen the
wings of commercial aircraft in the interest of safety would make the air-
planes less safe, as they become heavier and less maneuverable. " The more
that government strives to eliminate the last bit of potential risk, the greater
the danger of adverse consequences: "[A]s we try to squeeze out more and
more risk, the pressure leading to side effects may grow."
5'
This apparent incoherence does not render the precautionary principle practically
meaningless, however. As a realistic matter, any environmental regulatory dispute will
admit of a range of politically feasible outcomes. The true pragmatic importance of the
precautionary principle is its use to argue for the most restrictive of the possible regulatory
approaches.
48. Id. at 428 (noting that rhetoric of precautionary principle "assum[es] also that there
are no health detriments from the proposed regulation").
49. See JOHN D. GRAHAM & JONATHAN B. WIENER, RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADE-OFFs
IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1995) (arguing that regulation under
precautionary principle can do more harm than good). Graham and Wiener note that as we
have "conquered many of the most obvious and easily preventable risks," future risk reduc-
tion efforts will have a greater tendency "toward countervailing risks." Id. at 12; see also
Ronald Bailey, Prologue, in THE TRUE STATE OF THE PLANET 1, 5 (Ronald Bailey ed.,
1995) (urging that "following the precautionary principle can lead to greater environmental
degradation"). The remainder of this Article demonstrates how this counterintuitive claim
is often true.
50. See H.W. LEwis, TECHNOLOGICAL RISK 113 (1990) (discussing how overemphasis
of strong airplane wings would make planes less safe rather than more). The airplane wings
case is not an isolated, unrepresentative example. Lewis goes on to say that:
Buildings that are rigidly enforced to have adequate strength to deal with earth-
quakes will fail where more flexible ones won't.... Excessive testing of vital
emergency diesel generators at nuclear power plants, to assure their availability
in time of need, is wearing them out. If the airlines didn't fly in bad weather,
more people would drive, which is riskier. Reluctance to accept medical x-rays,
for fear of radiation, can leave serious diseases undiagnosed .... If astronauts
(another real case) are forced to practice for all conceivable emergencies, they
will be less well prepared for those few that are more likely.
Id. at 116.
51. GRAHAM & WIENER, supra note 49, at 12. The authors also note that "as we
address ever small target risks, the importance of countervailing risks relative to the target
risks is likely to increase." Id.
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Applied fully and logically, the precautionary principle would cannibal-
ize itself and potentially obliterate all environmental regulation. Environ-
mentalists would apply the principle to chemicals and industries, but why not
apply it to the environmental regulations themselves? According to the bur-
den of proof approach, advocates of regulation would be required to demon-
strate to a certainty the absence of counterproductive effects on health result-
ing from the effects of the regulation itself. The practical consequences of
regulation are so uncertain that advocates typically could not meet this bur-
den, and the precautionary principle would preclude further regulation.
At this point, devotees of the precautionary principle surely will object
to such use of the principle, claiming that we "know" adverse health effects
from pollution are common, while adverse health effects from public health
regulation are presumed to be rare.5' This is a key factual claim that I will
set out to disprove in the remainder of this Article. If it is true that environ-
mental and public health regulations frequently produce health or other envir-
onmental harms, the basis for the precautionary principle collapses. In this
case, the principle itself would counsel against adopting environmental regu-
lations.
The first section of this Article reviews the physical risks attendant to
environmental regulations. These risks may arise in a variety of ways. The
three main sources of risk analyzed are the risks from alternatives to the
controlled substance or practice, the health benefits foregone from the regu-
lation of products or activities, and the risks created by the remediation
measures themselves. The section provides a considerable number of exam-
ples demonstrating the prevalence of risk trade-offs that can render protective
effects hazardous in themselves.
The second section considers indirect risks attendant to the precautionary
principle, above and beyond the inescapable direct physical harms. First, the
precautionary principle skews prioritization of government efforts to reduce
risk. The consequence is less risk reduction than otherwise could occur.
Moreover, the skewing of priorities will contribute to an unfair distribution
of environmental risk, as in the case of "environmental racism." Second, the
precautionary principle creates indirect health risks through its wealth effects.
As noted above, the contrast of health and money has been employed to
justify the precautionary principle, but adherents have overlooked the health
benefits of income. A significant economic cost may result in significant
health risks.
52. See Frank B. Cross, When Environmental Regulations Kill, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 729,
730 (1995) (describing discussion of adverse consequences but noting that "most assumed
that the counterproductive effects of regulation were rare").
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The third section addresses an alternative to the precautionary principle.
The principle is grounded in the limitations and uncertainties of scientific
knowledge. While these limitations are undeniable, they do not call for an
artificial decision rule that ignores the science, such as the precautionary
principle. Rather, policymakers should confront the scientific uncertainty
and act prudently in accord with the best possible scientific understanding.
This approach may sometimes call for precaution, but only after considering
the potentially substantial risks attendant to precaution.' 3 The proposed pol-
icy might itself be considered a form of the precautionary principle, though
in vastly expanded form, with better recognition of the full consequences of
regulatory action.
I do not propose a wholly reactionary case for government doing
nothing in support of public health and the environment. Public health policy
is not a Newtonian world in which every action must produce an opposite
and equal reaction. In reality, some government actions are "risk-superior"
and improve overall health,54 while other well-meaning actions actually make
problems worse. I simply call for a thoughtful policy to distinguish between
these situations. Present applications of the precautionary principle, how-
ever, make such distinctions impossible and promote even perverse policies.
L Physical Risks of the Precautionary Principle
Much environmental law and regulation unfortunately reflects a rather
one-dimensional deontological focus. Public and regulatory attention centers
on a specific perceived problem (say, DDT) that is considered to cause some
type of harm, often to public health. The common demand is to eliminate
the problem, such as by banning the objectionable product. Seldom do the
nonfinancial consequences of the prohibition receive much attention. Ad-
dressing these consequences would serve to complicate an otherwise simple
and appealing political issue. Yet failure to attend to these consequences
may render the action counterproductive, causing more health harm than
good. This section considers the ways in which action may be counterpro-
ductive and catalogues a significant number of supporting cases.
The risks resulting from regulation are a manifestation of the law of un-
intended consequences, as expounded by Robert Merton, Reinhold Niebuhr,
and many others. Well-meaning efforts to achieve some goal may have
perverse side effects that actually undermine the goal. This risk is well-
53. As Breyer observes, "regulators should investigate carefully in order to avoid
actions that kill more people than they save." BREYER, supra note 30, at 65.
54. See GRAHAM & WIBNER, supra note 49, at 3 (defining "risk-superior" alternative
as one that involves "reducing overall risk rather than trading one kind of risk for another").
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known in other fields, such as in medicine, where it is known as iatrogenesis
or side effects, and in the military, where it is known as collateral damage.
Consider the situation on a small island off Hawaii, historically used as a
United States military chemical weapons repository. These weapons must
now be destroyed under federal law. Incineration is the only available means
of destruction, but environmental groups have frustrated efforts to incinerate
the weapons due to the presence of some risk from airborne pollution.
Avoidance of a small and uncertain risk from incinerator air pollution, how-
ever, has left literal time bombs on the island that "pose an imminent dan-
ger" from the leakage of chemical weapons or even from explosion. " In this
case, the adverse consequences of not incinerating are rather obvious. The
consequences of most protective government regulations are much less appar-
ent, but they may nevertheless prove to be quite substantial, as this section
will attempt to demonstrate.
A. Risks from Alternatives
In a free market, product sales and other commercial activities exist
because of some market demand. A decision to ban the product or activity
does not eliminate the demand for its uses. As a consequence, producers and
consumers typically will shift from the banned or regulated entity to some
alternative product or activity.56 This shift plainly reveals the potential health
risks of precaution. If the alternative activity is more hazardous than the
original, the regulation will cause more harm than it cures. And efforts to
regulate the alternative will only yield another alternative, which may or may
not be preferable from a health standpoint. This scenario was played out in
the case of artificial sweeteners.
A family of sweeteners called cyclamates was removed from the market
in the late 1960s, when evidence arose regarding their potential carcinogenic-
55. Stephen J. Driscoll, Environmental Private Actions: Are Special Interest Groups
Hobbling Comprehensive Programs Without "Standing" Themselves?, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 469,
473-74 (1993) (summarizing chemical weapons problem). A similar example has arisen in
the continental United States. Families in Anniston, Alabama have opposed government
efforts to incinerate chemical weapons, out of fear of exposure to their children. Yet
"thousands of drums" have been sitting at the local army depot, "gradually corroding."
EASTERBROOK, supra note 4, at 620. The risk of leaks "from these old shells are far more
likely than from the high-tech new incinerator." Id.
56. See Ralph L. Keeney, Understanding Life-Threatening Risks, 15 RISK ANALYSIS
627, 628 (1995) (observing that "elimination of any one alternative de facto means the
selection of another, and any selected alternative will always have its risks"). This new
source of risk is commonly ignored, as "people have a tendency to compare the active
choice of an alternative to an unspecified alternative assumed to have zero risk." 1d.
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ity.Y Saccharin rushed in to meet the market demand for artificial sweeten-
ing. The FDA then proposed to ban saccharin because of evidence of carcin-
ogenicity. Congress, which overturned the ban, let saccharin off with a
warning. 8 Saccharin was probably riskier than cyclamates. 19 The saccharin
warning may have deterred some purchasers and encouraged consumers to
shift to aspartame, which has its own health questions. 0 Moreover, any
restriction on artificial sweeteners "may increase consumption of sugar, with
attendant risks of weight gain in some consumers and particular risks for
diabetics." 6'
The risk of alternatives is obvious in the case of regulating electric
power generation. 62 Every large-scale source of electrical power presents
57. See Cyclamate; Denial of Petition, 41 Fed. Reg. 43,754, 43,754-55 (1976). The
ban was based on a study that "raised questions as to cyclamate's possible carcinogenicity."
Frederick H. Degnan & W. Gary Flamm, Living With and Reforming the Delaney Clause,
50 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 235, 240 (1995). The ban was sustained the following year
because cyclamate's manufacturers could not establish the safety of the substance. Id.
At the time, the "[FDA] Commissioner readily acknowledged that these [data] did not prove
that cyclamate was a carcinogen." Id. This is a classic application of the precaution-
ary principle. Some years later, the NAS reported that "cyclamate was not a carcinogen."
Id.
58. The FDA's proposed ban on saccharin was based in part on the Delaney Clause.
See Food Additives Permitted in Food for Human Consumption or in Contact With Food
on an Interim Basis Pending Additional Study: Saccharin and Its Salts, 42 Fed. Reg. 1461,
1461-62 (1977) (discussing basis for general ban on saccharine). A considerable public
outcry ensued. See Richard Cooper, Saccharin - Of Risk and Democracy, 40 FOOD DRUG
COSM. L.J. 34 (1985) (summarizing public complaints about removing saccharin from
market). Congress responded with the Saccharin Study and Labeling Act, Pub. L. No. 95-
203, 91 Stat. 1452 (1977) (amended 1980, 1981, and 1983), which placed a moratorium on
any ban of saccharin and provided for labeling about the risk. See generally William B.
Schultz, The Bitter Aftertaste of Saccharin, 40 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 66 (1985) (summa-
rizing reasons for and reviewing nature of congressional intervention).
59. See PETER ASCH, CONSUMER SAFETY REGULATION 119 (1988) (suggesting that
"the cyclamate ban, by contributing to increased saccharin consumption, may have had a net
carcinogenic effect"); Paulette L. Stenzel, Right-to-Know Provisions of California's Proposi-
tion 65: The Naivete of the Delaney Clause Revisited, 15 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 493, 519
(1991) (stating that "strong evidence shows that saccharin has a higher carcinogenic potential
than cyclamates"); Edward W. Warren & Gary E. Marchant, "More Good than Harm": A
First Principle for Environmental Agencies and Reviewing Courts, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 379,
389 (1993) (reporting that "the banning of cyclamates resulted in greater use of saccharin,
which scientists now believe to be a more potent carcinogen than cyclamates").
60. See LEWIS, supra note 50, at 152 (noting that aspartame had "health hazards of
its own but no known evidence of carcinogenicity").
61. GRAHAM & WIENER, supra note 49, at 14.
62. See Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA.
L. REv. 1027, 1032 (1990) (reporting that "conventional centralized power plants are
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some risks to human health. Coal-fired generation is a source of air pollu-
tion that presents a direct risk to human health, and the carbon dioxide it
produces contributes to global warming. The mining and shipping of coal
also entails material risks to health. Other fossil fuels are cleaner but pro-
duce their own air pollution from combustion by-products. Nuclear power
has well-known risks that include the possibility of reactor accidents and the
problems of nuclear waste disposal.
Given the omnipresence of risk, the precautionary principle tells us little
about the preferred source of power. The precautionary principle is not
employed so comprehensively, however, but typically arises in the context
of a specific regulation of a particular power source. Thus, the precaution-
ary principle will be invoked in Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulatory
attention to nuclear power plant risks. Advocates will argue that stricter
rules are necessary, given the importance of safety and uncertainty of risk.
They will not consider the possibility that stricter rules may cause power
generators to shift to some other source of power, such as fossil fuel com-
bustion, and the precautionary principle will not be applied with respect to
the consequent risks of fossil fuels.
The trade-offs among power sources will occur, however, even if they
are not recognized by regulators and interest groups. When protests pre-
vented the construction of a nuclear power plant at Shoreham, New York,
the Long Island Lighting Company replaced the lost power with fossil fuel-
fired generation. 63 Power not generated by one source must come from
another, and the alternative source inevitably carries its own risks. Some
might argue that the answer is a reduction in power consumption, yet conser-
vation carries its own risks, as discussed below.' a
If a public health regulation of nuclear power causes a shift to fossil
fuels, the health cost may be considerable. The first rigorous comparison
of health risks from electric power production was performed by Herbert
Inhaber for the Canadian Atomic Energy Control Board. 6 He estimated that
the mortality from a single coal-fired plant could range from 50 to 1600
deaths, but that a nuclear power plant might be expected to cause only 2.5
probably safer than wood stoves, perhaps safer than alternative decentralized power sources
(such as solar), perhaps safer, even, than energy conservation (insulation is not free of
danger) - with nuclear power the least risky of all in the view of a considerable number
of experts").
63. Peter Passell, The American Sense of Peril: A Stifling Cost of Modern Life, N.Y.
TIMEs, May 8, 1989, at D12.
64. See infra notes 78-82 and accompanying text (discussing health risks generated by
some conservation efforts).
65. HERBERT INHABER, ENERGY RISK AssESSMENT (1982).
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to 15 deaths. 6  Hence, causing a shift from a nuclear plant to a coal plant
would cause at least three times more mortality, and possibly thousands more
deaths. Inhaber was followed by a study by J.H. Fremlin, who calculated
that oil and coal power generation would cause over fifty deaths for each
power unit of ten gigawatt-years, while natural gas and nuclear power would
cause less than one.67 One scientist argued that "every time a coal burning
plant is built instead of a nuclear plant, something like 1000 extra Americans
are condemned to an early death." 
68
These studies were criticized as being unduly favorable to nuclear
power, and the authors had an open connection with the nuclear industry.
The less challengeable National Academy of Sciences (NAS) performed its
own study and came to comparable conclusions. According to the NAS, a
single coal plant could be expected to cause from five to fifty-five deaths,
while a nuclear power plant of comparable size would cause less than one.69
The most recent major study was performed by the Pace University Center
for Environmental Legal Studies and led by former Democratic Congressman
Richard Ottinger.70 Rather than simply comparing deaths, the Pace study
sought to quantify economically all the environmental costs of power produc-
tion, including losses associated with climate change. The costs varied by
type of plant, but for existing coal plants the cost was more than twice that
of a nuclear plant, and oil-fired generation was no better.71 Moreover, the
Pace study was rigged against nuclear power. While the environmental costs
of fossil fuel production were limited to air pollution, excluding occupational
and transportation accidents, the Pace study included occupational mortality
in its estimates of nuclear costs.' The costs for nuclear power were also
66. Id. at 352. Ol plants were nearly as bad as coal generation, causing 20 to 1400
deaths. Natural gas, by contrast, was the safest of all, producing only one to four expected
deaths. Id.
67. J.H. FREMLIN, POWER PRODUCTION: WHAT ARE THE RISKS? 198 (1989).
68. Bernard L. Cohen, Perspectives on the Cost Effectiveness of Life Saving, in
RATIONAL READINGS ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS 461, 467 (Jay Lehr ed., 1992).
69. Christoph Hohenemser et al., Nuclear Power, in PERILOUS PROGRESS: MANAGING
THE HAZARDS OF TECHNOLOGY 219, 222-23 (Robert W. Kates et al. eds., 1984).
70. PACE UNIV. CTR. FOR ENvTL. LEGAL STUDIES, ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF
ELECTRICITY (1991).
71. Costs per kilowatt-hour for existing coal plants were 6.8 cents, though other forms
of coal generation ranged from 2.8 to 4.5 cents. Id. at 31. Oil externality costs ranged
from 3 to 7.9 cents per kilowatt-hour. Id. at 32. Nuclear power plant costs were 2.91 cents
per kilowatt-hour. Id. at 34.
72. Compare id. at 371 (estimate for coal units, which considers only airborne
emissions of four pollutants) with id. at 371-75 (estimate for nuclear units including
occupational health costs).
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inflated by the questionable judgment of using the Soviet Chernobyl accident
to extrapolate U.S. costs, but Pace did not even consider the consequences
of accidents at fossil fuel plants.73
The risk of harm from obstructing nuclear power is even more striking
when one considers specific types of harms. For example, many fail to
appreciate that the routine radioactive emissions associated with coal and oil
plants are higher than those allowed from equivalent nuclear reactors. 74
Long-lived nuclear wastes are particularly feared by the public, but one study
found that the wastes produced by coal burning, or even solar power, pre-
sented a much greater public health threat than the wastes from a nuclear
power plant.75 Americans likewise fear a nuclear accident but may be
unaware that:
[T]he likelihood of a severe accident leading to a given number of acute
fatalities per unit of electricity produced is around 3 orders of magnitude
higher in the case of fossil fuel energy cycles than in that of the nuclear cycle
based on the type of light water reactors in operation in the western world.76
The accident at the Three Mile Island reactor was hyped extensively in the
media, but studies after the accident found that those living near the plant
actually suffered fewer cancer deaths than would be expected. 77
73. Id. at 378-84 (discussing nuclear accidents based on Chernobyl). The Pace Center
for Environmental Legal Studies concedes that the extrapolation is "somewhat speculative."
Id. at 381.
74. See Hohenemser et al., supra note 69, at 220 (coal); CROSS, supra note 47, at 30
(coal); EASTERBROOK, supra note 4, at 494 (oil). This effect occurs because the fossil fuels
contain radioactive particles that are released when burned.
75. Bernard L. Cohen, Risk Analyses of Buried Wastes from Electricity Generation,
in THE RISK ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND HUMAN HEALTH HAZARDS: A TEXT-
BOOK OF CASE STUDIES 561, 573 (Dennis J. Paustenbach ed., 1989) [hereinafter THE RISK
ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND HUMAN HEALTH HAZARDS]. The construction of
photovoltaic cells "requires toxic materials from cadmium to hydrofluoric acid," which,
"together with the large maintenance problem involved in keeping the collectors, mirrors,
lenses, and solar cells free from dust, greasy films, and snow, combines to make solar
power one of the least safe ways to generate electricity." DIxY L. RAY & Lou Guzzo,
TRASHING THE PLANET 130-31 (1990). In addition to the Cohen study above, this conclu-
sion was also reached by Samuel McCracken. SAMUEL MCCRACKEN, THE WAR AGAINST
THE ATOM 86-87 (1982). Most of these risks would be suffered by workers rather than
the general population. See Deroy Murdock, Eco-Dilemmas: How "Green" Policies Hurt
Mother Nature, 7 ETHNIC NEWSWATCH, Oct. 31, 1995, at 27 (reporting how solar and wind
power destroy considerable number of natural habitats and how solar power produces toxic
pollution).
76. Andrew Fritzsche, Severe Accidents: Can They Occur Only in the Nuclear Pro-
duction of Electricity?, 12 RISK ANALYSIS 327, 329 (1992).
77. MELVIN A. BENARDE, OUR PRECARIOUS HABITAT 365 (1989).
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The best data appear to indicate that nuclear power is distinctly safer
than fossil fuel power generation, but the case against the precautionary
principle need not rely upon this factual finding. Rather, the case requires
only the obvious conclusion that some sources are relatively riskier than
others. Perhaps nuclear power is more hazardous than coal power. If so,
applying the precautionary principle when regulating coal generation could
increase the overall risks through a shift to nuclear power. The precaution-
ary principle is a poor guide to regulation when hazardous alternatives may
exist.
Those in favor of regulation may seek an escape hatch in the form of
energy conservation, which might be considered consistent with the precau-
tionary principle. The typical answer to this contention is that conservation
can only reduce, not eliminate, the need for power plants. The remaining
power plants should be as safe as possible. A more compelling answer is
typically overlooked - energy conservation measures may cause death at
a rate exceeding that of hazardous power sources.
The most significant source of energy conservation, particularly for
electricity, has been the weatherization programs that prevent the loss of
heating or cooling through building insulation. The beneficial retention of
heat is accompanied by the retention of all forms of indoor pollutants. A
build up in indoor radon consequent to weatherization has been implicated
in as many as twenty thousand cancer deaths each year. 8 Weatherization
also furthers the concentration of volatile organic compounds, particulates,
and other pollutants. Because indoor levels of these substances are typically
higher than outdoor levels, conservation may well cause more deaths than
the outdoor pollution from oil or coal burning.79 Even an apparently benign
maneuver, such as planting shade trees to reduce air conditioning use, will
increase the growth of mold spores that cause considerable incidence of
disease.' The Pace study found that a shift to more efficient appliances
could increase emissions of chlorofluorocarbons, 8 and efforts to shift
electricity usage to off-peak hours could have the practical effect of increas-
ing air pollution.' Not all conservation measures are themselves deadly,
but the above catalogue of risks instructs that such measures are not inevita-
bly safe either. A shift to greater conservation could increase mortality and
morbidity.
78. FRANK B. CROSS, LEGAL RESPONSES TO INDOOR AIR POLLUTION 6 (1990).
79. Id. at 51-60.
80. Id. at 62.
81. See PACE UNIV. CTR. FOR ENvTL. LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 70, at 491-98.
82. Id. at 499-505.
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For a time, environmentalists argued that we should "split wood, not
atoms." They contended that returning to more traditional energy sources,
such as woodburning, would be a safe replacement for electrical power.
In fact, a major shift to personal woodburning for home fuel could have
been an environmental catastrophe. The quantity of wood required for a
broad scale replacement of electricity could have denuded our nation's
forests, with attendant harms to a variety of species. More significantly,
the burning of wood is very hazardous to human health. When some began
to shift to woodburning, the EPA had to set air pollution standards for
woodstoves, which had become the source of fifteen percent of airborne
particulates, including serious carcinogens.' Furthermore, woodstoves
became a major source of accidents, causing home fires and hundreds of
deaths each year.A Some environmentalists applied the precautionary
principle to large, centralized power plants and correspondingly favored a
shift to an old-fashioned, traditional form of heating, which happened to be
far more hazardous than the large power plants.
The consequences of error resulting from an unwise selection of power
sources due to the precautionary principle is magnified many times over in
poorer nations. Many residents of these nations lack electricity and rely
upon wood or dung fires for home fuel. These sources produce consider-
able outdoor smoke and a literally choking level of indoor air pollution.
Residents of these nations breathe in air pollution levels more than ten times
those found in the United States.' The World Bank estimates that this
indoor air pollution kills four million children every year from acute respir-
atory disease.' In addition, half of all adult women in developing countries
83. See EPA Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources; New Residential
Wood Heaters, 53 Fed. Reg. 5860, 5860-926 (1988) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60 (1996));
see also EASTERBROOK, supra note 4, at 581 (pointing out that "highest airborne particulate
pollution reading ever recorded in the United States came not in Cleveland or Pittsburgh but
in the trendy community of Klamath Falls, Oregon, where the elite heat with wood to be
natural").
84. Ross E. CHEIT, SETTING SAFETY STANDARDS: REGULATION IN THE PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE SECTORs 82 (1990).
85. Gregg Easterbrook, Forget PCBs. Radon. Alar., N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 11, 1994,
(Magazine), at 62. Indoor particulate concentrations measured in New Guinea, Kenya,
India, and Nepal were as much as 50 times higher than the U.S. standard for ambient ex-
posures. See David C. Christiani, Urban and Transboundary Air Pollution: Human Health
Consequences, in CRITICAL CONDITION: HUMAN HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 13, 19
(Eric Chivian et al. eds., 1993).
86. THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1992: DEVELOPMENT AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 52; see also EASTERBROOK, supra note 4, at 314 (suggesting that "three
million Third World children died preventable deaths in 1991 from acute respiratory distress
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suffer from chronic heart or lung diseases due to the pollution from biomass
burning.7
The indoor air pollution abattoir affecting poor countries could be
ameliorated through the development of large power plants or hydroelectric
dams that produce electricity to replace indoor burning. Tragically, "West-
ern environmental lobbies oppose nearly all new central energy production
ficilities for the developing world, especially hydroelectric plants." 8 The
precautionary concern for habitats or the health consequences of power
plants translates into a mortal enormity for the poor children of developing
nations. The wood burning obviously contributes to serious deforestation
problems in these nations as well. Perpetuation of traditional sources of
fuel in poorer nations causes more deaths and obstructs economic prog-
ress.
89
Another source of risk from alternatives exists in pesticide regulation.
After Rachel Carson's warning, the public grew concerned about the envir-
onmental and health effects of DDT and other long-lasting pesticides. The
public concern eventually translated into government action, which forced
the category of organochloride pesticides off the market. This group of
pesticides was replaced by those in the organophosphate family, such as
malathion, diazinon, and dichlorvos.
Carson and others criticized organochlorides for being environmentally
long-lasting, and the organophosphates did have a shorter active life. How-
ever, the organophosphates are more acutely toxic in their short life, and
are even related to forms of nerve gas. The switch had the effect of trans-
forming a highly uncertain, long run risk from organochlorines into a more
certain, immediate, and significant risk of toxicity from the organophos-
phates. 9 This risk is felt primarily by the farmworkers involved in the
brought on by living in unventilated huts where heating and cooking was done with wood
or even dung, causing smoke damage to the lungs"). These deaths could have been avoided
with greater electrification. Id.
87. THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1993: INVESTING IN HEALTH
92.
88. Easterbrook, supra note 85, at 62; see also EASTERBROOK, supra note 4, at 583
(observing that "[w]hile the Western environmental community shows little interest in such
issues as dung-smoke pollution, it is devoting intense energies to stopping developing-world
hydroelectricity").
89. A recent study shows how societal advancement to more centralized, higher grades
of energy resources is closely linked with economic growth. Douglas B. Reynolds, Energy
Grades and Economic Growth, 19 J. ENERGY DEv. 245 (1996).
90. See WELDAvsKy, supra note 26, at 58 (noting that "organophosphate insecticides,
such as the parathions,... are hundreds of times more toxic to man than DDT").
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application of the pesticides,9 although children are also at risk.' The shift
to organophosphates "caused incidents of serious poisoning among unsus-
pecting workers and farmers who had been accustomed to handling the
relatively nontoxic DDT."I While deaths and injuries in most jobs have
decreased over the years, the number of accidental pesticide poisonings
increased by fourteen percent over the decade following the DDT ban.94
The President of NAS reproached the public by declaring that the "pre-
dicted death or blinding by parathion of dozens of Americans last summer
must rest on the consciences of every car owner whose bumper sticker
urged a total ban on DDT."95 To employ the anecdotal approach common
to antipesticide campaigns, consider the case of Clarence Lee Boyette. He
was informed that use of DDT to control a worm infestation on his tobacco
crop would preclude his receiving government price supports; he therefore
used a brand of parathion, which subsequently killed his youngest son.
96
The prohibition of DDT also had some adverse consequences to the envi-
ronment.97
91. See, e.g., Stephen Ciesielski, Pesticide Risk Assessment and Reduction Among
Migrant Farmworkers in North Carolina, 106 PUB. HEALTH REP. 207 (1991) (reporting that
"[mlost of the pesticides used in agriculture ... are organophosphates applied to crops
picked by migrant farmworkers"). The organophosphate pesticides can affect the nervous
system, causing "breathing impairment, blurred vision" and "a variety of neurologic and
cognitive deficits." Id.
92. See, e.g., Robert J. Ziener & Charles M. Ginsburg, Organophosphate and
Carbamate Poisoning in Infants and Children, 81 PEDIATRICS 121 (1988).
93. GRAHAM & WIENER, supra note 49, at 174.
94. Harlan Austin et al., A Prospective Follow Up Study of Cancer Mortality in
Relation to Serum DDT, 79 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 43 (1989); see also WILDAVSKY, supra
note 26, at 73 ("As DDT was phased out and organophosphates were used more, mortalities
increased sharply. In 1972 estimates of the number of deaths jumped to 118 for the first
half of the year alone."). The failure to consider the risks of DDT replacements "cost
several hundred lives." Id. at 80.
95. RICHARD L. STROUP & JOHN C. GOODMAN, MAKING THE WORLD LEss SAFE: THE
UNHEALTHY TREND IN HEALTH, SAFETY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 4 (1989)
(quoting President of NAS reproaching those who supported ban of DDT); see also GRA-
HAM & WIENER, supra note 49, at 189 (reporting that "beneficiaries of reduced residue and
persistence - consumers and wildlife - may be enjoying the benefits of a risk transfer to
farm workers").
96. WiLDAVSKY, supra note 26, at 72.
97. See id. at 58 (discussing adverse environmental effects of DDT ban). Wildavsky
reports that shortly after the banning of DDT, tussock moths invaded and began killing
Douglas firs in the Northwest to such a degree that the EPA had to temporarily permit the
use of DDT on infested forests in Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and Montana. In addition,
the use of DDT substitutes wiped out 83,000 California bee hives. RITA GRAY BEATTY,
THE DDT MYTH: TRIUMPH OF THE AMATEURS 130 (1973). The banning of DDT may have
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Environmental laws often shift risks to workers. The constituency for
most environmental action consists of relatively well-to-do white collar
workers who show relatively little concern for occupational risks in blue-
collar jobs. 8 There is a general tendency that "reducing public risk often
means creating occupational risk" as exposures are shifted. 9 This shift may
be an inevitable consequence of regulation, politically if not physically."°
Existing patterns of precaution exert a systematic push of risks toward
disadvantaged groups in society. 10 1 Even organic farmers use sulfur and
other "natural" pesticides that are the source of "many worker poison-
ings. "
102
Many environmentalists recognize the risk of alternative pesticides and
therefore advocate the avoidance of pesticides altogether, much like they
seek energy conservation as a substitute for electric power production. 3
The typical response to calls for pesticide elimination is practical and
financial - growers argue that eliminating pesticides would have serious
adverse effects on the availability and price of food.1" This is true, as
helped bird species, but even here the evidence is quite uncertain. WILDAvSKY, supra note
26, at 65-67 (suggesting that DDT may have caused decline in bird populations but extent
is unknown).
98. Environmental policy tends to focus on the perceived problems of the affluent.
In consequence, "economically and politically oppressed groups in this country [have seen]
environmental reforms being used to direct social and economic resources away from
problems of the poor toward priorities of the affluent." ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN
DIXIE: RACE, CLASS AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 137 (1989).
99. Chris Whipple, Nonpessimistic Risk Assessment and De Minimis Risk as Risk
Management Tools, in THE RISK ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND HUMAN HEALTH
HAZARDS, supra note 75, at 1105, 1109. The author cites an example of how controls on
radioactive effluents in power plants significantly increased radiation exposure of workers.
Id. In another example, "EPA standards on grain dust emissions caused several major grain
elevator explosions." Cross, supra note 8, at 943.
100. See Keeney, supra note 56, at 629 (observing that "selection of an alternative leads
to a redistribution of risks not to zero risk").
101. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 8, at 925-26.
102. HARVARD CmR. FOR RISK ANALYSIS, RISK IN PERSPECTIVE, March 1995, at i; see
Leonard P. Gianessi, Use of Pesticides in the United States, in PESTICIDE RESIDUES AND
FOOD SAFETY 24, 28 (B.G. Tweedy et al. eds., 1991) (observing that organic growers use
pesticides such as sulfur).
103. The practicality of this approach is open to question. For many fruits and
vegetables, there is no good alternative to synthetic pesticides. While progress is being
made in genetic engineering, "these new varieties will probably lower rather than eliminate
the need for pesticides." NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, REGULATING PESTICIDES IN
FOOD 9 (1987).
104. See, e.g., Julie Corliss, The Delaney Clause: Too Much of a Good Thing?, 85 J.
NAT'L CANCER INST. 600, 601 (1993) (citing position of Professor Manfred Kroger that "the
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discussed below, 105 but an even more compelling, direct rejoinder would
note that the abolition of synthetic pesticides could increase the risk to
human health.
Chemical pesticides supplant or counteract natural carcinogens that
may be far more deadly than the synthetics. Stephen Breyer observed that
"a regulator does not, or cannot easily, take account of offsetting consumer
behavior as, for example, when a farmer, deprived of his small-cancer-risk
artificial pesticide, grows a new, hardier crop variety that contains more
'natural' pesticides which may be equally or more carcinogenic. " 10 Efforts
to breed a pest-free potato yielded a tuber so full of natural pesticides that
it was acutely poisonous to humans, 1" and efforts to create a naturally
insect-resistant form of celery, averting the need for synthetic pesticides,
produced a plant with eight times more psoralens, a naturally occurring
carcinogen.'08 In general, attempts to restrict "the use of potentially toxic
synthetic chemical pesticides may induce farmers to use plants bred to
harbor pest-resistant properties; the plants' pesticides may be more toxic
than the regulated synthetic pesticides. "19 In "the absence of protective
fungicides, plants in self-defense create phytoalexins, some of which are
toxic to humans and induce carcinomas in rodents."110
To some, the concept of natural pesticides or carcinogens seems dis-
cordant; they presume that it is artificial petrochemicals that are risky."'
Scientific research, however, has demonstrated that many natural substances
benefits of pesticides, which help ensure widely available and affordable fruits and vegeta-
bles, justify their use").
105. See infra notes 197-202 and accompanying text (discussing estimated price in-
creases for beneficial fruits and vegetables if pesticides were banned).
106. BREYER, supra note 30, at 23 (1994).
107. MICHAEL FUMENTO, SCIENCE UNDER SIEGE: BALANCING TECHNOLOGY AND THE
ENVRONMENT 66 (1993).
108. Jane Brody, Strong Vews on Origins of Cancer, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1995, at B9;
see also FUMENTO, supra note 107, at 66.
109. GRAHAM & WIENER, supra note 49, at 16. The authors cite the example of
cassava root, as well as the celery and potato cases already mentioned. See also C. Robert
Taylor, Economic Impacts and Environmental and Food Safety Trade-Offs of Pesticide Use
Reduction on Fruits and Vegetables 18 (1995) (unpublished research paper, Auburn Dep't
of Agric. Econ. and Rural Soc.) (suggesting that "there would be adverse indirect food
safety consequences of severely restricting or banning pesticide use in terms of increased
contamination by fungal products and by phytoalexins created in self-defense by plants").
110. Philip H. Abelson, Adequate Supplies of Fruits and Vegetables, 266 SCIENCE 1303,
1303 (Nov. 25, 1994).
111. See Tesh, supra note 13, at 11 (observing that "[e]nvironmentalism ... assigns
political significance only to pollution resulting from human activity").
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cause cancer and are far more prevalent and deadly than are the synthetic
pesticides. This should not be too surprising - arsenic, for example, is a
natural constituent in plants."' Dr. Bruce Ames of the University of
California has found that Americans consume about ten thousand times the
load of natural pesticides as they do of those that are man-made."' The
quantity of natural carcinogens in a single cup of coffee is roughly "equiva-
lent to the total amount of pesticide residues an average person would take
into his or her body in a year."''  Existing natural carcinogens may be
unavoidable and unregulatable, but that fact does not make a case for
substituting natural carcinogens for synthetic pesticides. Pesticides may
reduce natural carcinogen exposure. Ames, a widely respected biochemist
and molecular biologist, has flatly stated that "pesticides lower the cancer
rate."115 When daminozide (trade named Alar) was prohibited after a great
public outcry, the result was an increase in public exposure to the higher
112. See EASTERROOK, supra note 4, at 83. Tobacco contains nicotine because that
substance kills or deters insects and animals that otherwise might feed on tobacco leaves.
Id.
113. Bruce Ames et al., Ranking Possible Carcinogenic Hazards, 236 SCIENCE 271, 272
(Apr. 17, 1987). These natural carcinogens are "virtually everywhere" and found "in almost
all fruits and vegetables, including apples, bananas, broccoli, brussels sprouts, cabbage,
mushrooms, and oranges." WILDAVSKY, supra note 26, at 60. Not only are natural carcin-
ogens present, they are comparably hazardous. See BENARDE, supra note 77, at 71 (noting
that "few synthetic chemicals equal the potency and human toxicity of naturally occurring
products"). Easterbrook writes that:
All-natural bread would be listed as containing formaldehyde, the ultimate pre-
servative. All-natural peanut butter would be listed as containing aflatoxins, a
family of potent fungal poisons. All-natural apple juice would be listed as con-
taining as many as 137 natural "volatiles," organic compounds that are primary
ingredients in urban smog; three are known rodent carcinogens. Various foods
ingested daily would be listed as containing on a purely natural basis arsenic,
heterocyclic amines (a rodent carcinogen group), lead, and other scrumptious
stuff . . . when given to lab animals, vitamin A appears powerfully carcino-
genic.
EASTERBROOK, supra note 4, at 116.
114. WILDAVSKY, supra note 26, at 266. This is not to suggest that coffee is highly
dangerous because it is not. The comparison simply demonstrates how low the risk is from
synthetic pesticides and the potential increase caused by a switch to natural pesticides. "As
for the idea that the human body copes well with natural carcinogens but badly with
synthetics, there is no supporting evidence. The body is a non-discriminatory equal op-
portunity ingestor to which a chemical is a chemical is a chemical." Id. We have not had
enough generations for human evolution to establish an immunity to natural substances.
This is obvious from the continued carcinogenic effect of a substance such as radiation,
which is natural and to which humans have been exposed for their entire history.
115. Brody, supra note 108, at B5 (quoting Dr. Bruce Ames).
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carcinogenic risk of mycotoxins in molds on apples. 16 Given the very
small exposure to man-made pesticides,"' the chance of worsening risks
through their prohibition is apparent. The levels of natural carcinogens
"may increase dramatically in plants damaged by insects or fungi."I
The perverse effect of the precautionary principle can be more specifi-
cally illustrated by reference to ethylene dibromide (EDB). EDB was used
primarily to control the development of molds on grain and other foods.
Concern over the potential carcinogenic risk of EDB led to a public scare
over "killer muffins," and the government therefore banned the fungicide.
As it happens, "EDB is the safest known way to combat molds, which
produce some of the most potent carcinogens in all of nature.""' 9 One of
these molds, aflatoxin, is estimated to be one thousand times more carcino-
genic than EDB. 12 The EPA never considered the trade-off of risk, and "it
116. See Bruce N. Ames & Lois S. Gold, Environmental Pollution and Cancer: Some
Misconceptions, in RATIONAL READINGS ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS, supra note 68,
at 165 (observing that "[s]ince Alar produces healthier apples that stay on the trees, Alar-
treated fruit is less susceptible to molds"); Joseph D. Rosen, Much Ado About Alar, ISSUES
ScI. & TECH., Fall 1990, at 89 (stressing that organic apples may "contain high levels of
carcinogenic mycotoxins").
In addition, Alar's strengthening of the fruit's bond with the tree protected the apples
from insect pests, and the prohibition on Alar required greater use of "much harsher
insecticides." Warren T. Brookes, The Wasteful Pursuit of Zero Risk, FORBES, Apr. 30,
1990, at 162; see also WILDAVSKY, supra note 26, at 220 (reporting that without Alar's
prevention of fruit drop, apples have to be treated against ground pests, so that ban on
daminozide "may undermine efforts to decrease the total use of chemicals"); WALLACE
KAUFMAN, No TURNING BACK 80 (1994) (stating that elimination of Alar required 70
percent increase in use of other, harsher pesticides); Gianessi, supra note 102, at 29
(observing that Alar was crucial to Integrated Pest Management programs so that banning
Alar caused unquantified increase in use of other pesticides).
117. Even with existing pesticide applications, a majority of foods have no residues.
See Pasquale Lombardo & Norma J. Yess, The Food and Drug Administration Program on
Pesticide Residues in Food, in PESTICIDE RESIDUES AND FOOD SAFETY, supra note 102, at
162, 165 (noting that 58% of samples had no residues). Indeed, "dietary intakes of
pesticides are usually less than 1% of the Acceptable Daily Intakes (ADIs) established by
the United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Health Organization."
Id. at 166. A study of average dietary residue levels for a pesticide used on many crops
(chlorothalonil) found that the average residues were less than 0.2% of the already protec-
tive tolerance level set by government. Gary L. Eilrich, Tracking the Fate of Residues from
the Farm Gate to the Table, in PESTICIDE RESIDUES AND FOOD SAFETY, supra note 102, at
202, 211.
118. Fred R. Shank et al., Evolving Food Safety, in PESTICIDE RESIDUES AND FOOD
SAFETY, supra note 102, at 297, 299-300.
119. STROUP & GOODMAN, supra note 95, at 2.
120. Richard Wilson, Summary and Analysis, 16 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,226 (1986); see
also GRAHAM & WIENER, supra note 49, at 13 (noting that "ban on the fungicide EDB
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is quite possible that the public was exposed to a much higher risk through
aflatoxin than EDB would have presented."'" There were alternative
pesticides to protect against the molds, but the banning of EDB caused a
shift to fungicides that required greater quantities in application, greater
worker exposure, and greater hazard to those exposed workers.' The
EDB ban was "based on overblown fears of consumer carcinogenicity and
an underestimate of the risks to pesticide applicators who would be forced
to use more carcinogenic substitutes. " "
While electric power production and pesticides offer the best docu-
mented examples of risks from alternatives to banned or regulated products,
the principle has broader application. One manner in which the general
principle operates is in the retention of old risks, rather than exposure to
new risks. The precautionary principle tends to be primarily applied to new
sources of risk because we have beei accustomed to living with old risks
and are therefore less threatened by them. This conservative approach to
new risks, however, almost certainly increases theoverall harm to public
health.
The prohibition or restriction of a new facility through the precaution-
ary principle has the effect of perpetuating reliance on old facilities. This
is counterproductive because new products and facilities are almost univer-
sally safer than existing ones. There is "hardly a product in use today -
a car, plane, boiler, municipal water system, drug, vaccine or hypodermic
syringe - that is not many times safer than its counterpart of a generation
or even a decade ago. "" The history of energy production shows that
"[n]ew technologies that entered the marketplace substantially increased the
efficiency of all types of combustion equipment, reducing the amount of
removed its cancer risk, but in turn may have left on grains and nuts a fungus that promotes
aflatoxins more carcinogenic than the fungicide").
121. GRAHAM & WIENER, supra note 49, at 187; see also BREYER, supra note 30, at
17 (noting that ban on EDB "could lead farmers to switch to other, more dangerous fumi-
gants instead, or lead them to fumigate their crops less well, leaving more mold residues,
which bring with them an increased cancer risk from aflatoxin").
122. AARON WILDAVSKY, SEARCHING FOR SAFETY 202 (1988). The alternative
fumigant apparently presented even greater risks to workers. See William R. Havender,
EDB and the Marigold Option, REGULATION, Jan./Feb. 1984, at 13, 16 (discussing risks to
workers from alternative fumigant).
123. Donald T. Hornstein, Paradigms, Process and Politics: Risk and Regulatory
Desigr, in WORST THINGS FIRST? THE DEBATE OVER RISK-BASED NATIONAL PRIORITIES
147, 160 (Adam Finkel & Dominic Golding eds., 1994) [hereinafter WORST THINGS
FIRST?].
124. Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management
in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 298 (1985).
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soot produced and fuel burned for a given amount of usable energy."'"
Cass Sunstein has observed that "[t]o regulate new risks in the interest of
health and safety is to perpetuate old ones, and thus to reduce health and
safety. "126
Notwithstanding this general principle, environmental law repeatedly
employs the precautionary principle with respect to new risk sources. The
Clean Air Act, for example, provides for new source performance standards
that impose higher pollution control requirements on new and modified
sources of pollution. 27 On its face, stricter standards might seem to con-
tribute to pollution reduction. The costs added to new sources discourage
their development, however, and consequently perpetuate the use of older
sources. Since the Clean Air Act, U.S. electrical generating plants are
aging: "[l]n 1970 only two percent of U.S. electric generating capacity was
more than thirty years old; it is predicted that by 2000 the average age will
be thirty years. " One study found that the stricter new source standards
for electric power generating facilities actually caused a twenty percent
increase in total airborne emissions because of the perpetuation of old
plants.'29 Any restrictions on new technologies are likely to increase
relative risks.13°
Similar problems resulted from the Act's placing strict controls on
emissions from new automobiles. The control devices had a substantial
positive effect on new car emissions, but also significantly increased the
125. Indur M. Goklany, Richer Is Cleaner: Long Term Trends in Global Air Quality,
in THE TRUE STATE OF THE PLANET, supra note 49, at 339, 347. Goklany stresses that
"[c]leaner energy sources, such as natural gas, oil, and electricity were becoming increas-
ingly available as substitutes for coal and wood in homes, businesses, and industries." Id.
126. CASS SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 106 (1990).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (1994).
128. BEN BOLCH & HAROLD LYONS, APOCALYPSE NOT 23 (1993).
129. BRUCE YANDLE, THE POLITICAL LIMITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 88-89
(1989).
130. See Jatin Nathwani & Jan Narveson, Three Principles for Managing Risk in the
Public Interest, 15 RISK ANALYSIS 615, 616 (1995) (discussing positive effects of new
technology despite new risks). Nathwani and Narveson write:
New technologies, while they carry some risks with them, also reduce risk;
indeed, that is the normal effect of technology. The automobile, for example,
kills thousands per year, and injures even more. Yet its effect on the whole is
to increase life expectancy and health. The automobile speeding the stricken
patient to a hospital saves many more lives by getting there in time than it loses
by being involved in an accident on the way. The motor vehicles that deliver our
food before it rots promote our health, despite the occasional accident.
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price of new cars and reduced the turnover in the stock of automobiles. As
a result, there are more old cars on the road, and these older autos are a
primary source of urban air pollution. Before emission control regulations
in 1978, about fourteen percent of cars were more than ten years old; by
1982, about twenty-four percent of cars were ten or more years of age.'
The costs attendant to regulation have prolonged the life of old cars that
pollute more and tend to be more unsafe to drive. In this case, the initial
new car regulation may have produced a net benefit - the reduction in new
car pollution more than counterbalanced the increase from greater numbers
of old cars. However, placing more and more restrictions on new cars out
of an excess of precaution could well become counterproductive. The
entire program might have been more effective had the shift to old cars
been recognized from the outset.
Current demands for a shift to emission-free electric cars may well
represent a precautionary action that causes more harm than good. The
removal of lead from gasoline is a major environmental success story with
great benefits causing no apparent significant countervailing risks. The
introduction of electric cars, ostensibly for pollution prevention, could more
than destroy the benefit of the leaded gasoline regulation. Electric cars
require lead acid batteries to run." This lead must be mined, smelted, and
disposed of or recycled. At every step of the process, some lead will be
released into the environment. The researchers calculated that a 1998
model electric car would release sixty times more lead for each kilometer
of use than the old, leaded gasoline cars.' Even taking a best case sce-
nario of lead control indicates that the electric cars would have five times
the emissions of leaded gasoline vehicles."3 Thus, the precautionary effort
to eliminate all direct auto emissions will increase emissions of a more
hazardous pollutant - lead. Of course, the emissions of lead will primarily
occur in different places: near smelters or recyclers, rather than city streets.
131. ROBERT CRANDALL ET AL., REGULATING THE AUTOMOBILE 96 (1986).
132. See Lester B. Lave et al., Environmental Implications of Electric Cars, 268
SCIENCE 993, 993-95 (May 19, 1995) (discussing electric car technology and its environ-
mental effects). Some alternative battery technologies are becoming available, but these also
require the use of toxic heavy metals, such as nickel and cadmium. Id. The Executive
Director of the Electric Vehicle Association has emphasized that first-generation cars will
inevitably have lead acid batteries, but environmentalists note that the alternative heavy
metal technologies are also risky. See Peter Passell, Lead-Based Battery Used in Electric
Car May Pose Hazards, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1995, at Al. The risks from other sources
are more uncertain, but the very fact of the government mandate "puts a premium on using
the most conservative technological option," lead acid batteries.
133. Lave et al., supra note 132, at 995.
134. Id.
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In the process, the risk is not only increased, but shifted generally to poorer
populations who must live closer to industrial facilities."
The potential tragedy of electric cars is amplified because the prospec-
tive air pollution benefits from emission-free vehicles are largely vaporous.
Electric cars do not avoid fossil fuel combustion, they simply shift its locus
from internal combustion engines to electric power generating facilities.
The net effect of this shift is debatable, but there is good reason to think
that total emissions may increase due to a shift to electric vehicles.136
Studies suggest that the increase in sulfur dioxide emissions from a shift to
electric cars could be as little as 17% or as much as 2100%.137 New cars
are already so clean, thanks to past regulation, that any benefit from new
electric vehicles will inevitably be quite small. 38 While new electric power
plants must also meet stricter standards, their total pollution rate remains
higher than that for new cars 9 A compulsory shift to electric cars will
also drive up the price of all vehicles, exacerbating old car pollutiony as
discussed above. Finally, electric vehicles present unique safety risks that
have not been considered closely.141
135. See Robert D. Bullard, Unequal Environmental Protection: Incorporating Environ-
mental Justice in Decision Making, in WORST THINGS FIRST?, supra note 123, at 237, 245-
48 (discussing proximity of poor and minority groups to lead smelting operations).
136. The Rocky Mountain News editorialized that "if electric cars actually did catch on,
much busier coal-fired utility plants would pump enough additional sulfur oxide into the air
to more than make up for the pollutants that went away." ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEws, Jan.
10, 1996, at 39A.
137. Eric Peters, The False Promise of Electric Cars, 78 CONSUMERS' RES. MAG.,
Aug. 1995, at 10.
138. According to research in California, the cleanest fifty percent of the cars tested
emitted only three percent of total air pollution. Rick Henderson, Dirty Driving: Donald
Stedman and the EPA's Sins of Emission, PouIcY REVIEW, Spring 1992, at 56. A chemistry
professor suggested that most new cars are "as clean as me breathing." Id.; see also Peters,
supra note 137 (noting that automobiles are no longer primary or even secondary cause of
urban smog).
139. See, e.g., Kathleen Noble, Electric Car No Panacea, GOvERNING MAG., Oct. 5,
1992, at 6 (declaring that "gasoline and alcohol fuels both burn much cleaner than the fossil
fuels used by most power plants, even if power plants are using state-of-the-art scrubbing
technology").
140. See Murdock, supra note 75 (reporting that "[h]igher prices for both electrical and
gas-fueled cars" will cause "older, higher-emitting vehicles to be kept longer and driven
more"); Peters, supra note 137 (suggesting that electric car mandate could produce increase
of more than $500 in price of conventional vehicles).
141. See Peters, supra note 137 (citing General Accounting Office report suggesting that
electric vehicles threaten "high voltage electric shock, fire and [exposure to] toxic gases"
in addition to general safety risks attendant to automobile accidents).
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Another perverse program for automobile emission reduction is the use
of gasohol as an alternative fuel. In contrast to gasoline, ethanol has some
benefits, but also is more volatile and correspondingly increases emissions
of hydrocarbons, volatile organic compounds, and nitrogen oxides, which
are harmful in themselves and contribute to urban ozone problems. 42 A
switch to ethanol also would increase emissions of certain carcinogens 43
and add to global warming emissions.'" The ethanol case is more a story
of corporate rent-seeking than use of the precautionary principle, but it pro-
vides an additional example of how control measures may cause more harm
than good.
The Toxic Substances Control Act provides another story of a risky
shift to older products. When the EPA sets strict standards for the intro-
duction of new chemicals, placing upon them the burden of proof of safety,
the effect is the prolongation of the use of existing chemical products. This
unfortunately results "in both higher costs and increased risks: higher costs
because economic progress is delayed; increased risks because the new
products that would replace existing ones may be inherently less risky than
the latter.""'4  A strict safety requirement that is inconsistently applied
between old and new risks will inescapably reduce safety by preserving a
greater role for old products.
The old versus new risk problem arises in pesticide regulation. Many
traditional pesticides that were registered before and during the 1960s are
carcinogenic but were not subject to the rigors of modem testing."
Suppose that a new pesticide was presented for registration, and this new
pesticide had some weak evidence of carcinogenicity. The NAS has warned
that "[e]ven though approving the new chemical may reduce dietary cancer
risk because it would displace more potent, approved oncogens, the EPA
probably would maintain the status quo." 47 Analogously, the EPA proba-
142. Jonathan Adler, Clean Fuels, Dirty Air, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC
COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS 19, 23 (Michael S. Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr., eds. 1992).
143. Id.
144. FUMENTO, supra note 107, at 323.
145. Michael Shapiro, Toxic Substances Policy, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMEN-
TAL PROTECTION 195, 232-33 (Paul R. Portney ed., 1990).
146. See Sheehy, supra note 21, at 278 (observing that "it is widely suspected that
many old pesticides are carcinogenic" but remain widely used). Yet, "[niewer, safer, but
minimally carcinogenic pesticides, on the other hand, are banned from use by the Delaney
Clause." Id.
147. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 103, at 42. This risk is not just
hypothetical, as the authors observe that "[e]xamples of this scenario can also be found in
actions now pending before the EPA." Id.
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bly could not cancel the old hazardous pesticide without evidence of a rea-
sonably effective substitute, and the rigorous requirements for new pesticide
approval could preclude the availability of such a substitute.1 48 Precaution
about new pesticides may simply perpetuate greater hazards from older
chemicals. 149
The new source bias is a common problem in public health law and
regulation. Precaution is particularly applied to new sources, as "new tech-
nologies are feared... while very hazardous existing technologies are not
so feared."'50 Yet, this precautionary bias is pervasively counterproductive.
John Graham and Jonathan Wiener observe that "regulations that apply only
to new cars ... pesticides ... medicines, and industrial technology have
had the perverse effect of keeping more hazardous older products in use
longer."'' Inevitably, the selective application of the precautionary princi-
ple will cause more public health harm than benefit.
Another risk from alternatives arose from undue precaution about
hazardous waste exposures. The EPA closed a number of wells in North-
ern California due to the discovery of trace amounts of trichloroethylene in
the groundwater used by the wells. Closing the wells caused the owners to
seek other water sources, and in "all but two cases, the cancer risk from
California tap water was greater than the risks from the water in the wells
that were closed.""5 No well had a greater risk than drinking "an equal
volume of cola, beer, or wine. "'5 The government likewise closed wells
148. Id. at 43. The NAS suggests that under this scenario "[h]uman cancer risk would
rise, not fall." Id. at 42; see also GRAHAM & WIENER, supra note 49, at 184 ("When EPA
sets a tolerance for a new compound, it must consider only the risk of the new pesticide as
compared to the ADI or acceptable cancer risk and implicitly ignore the risks associated
with older pesticides already on the market. Yet older pesticides are often more toxic and
less carefully tailored to pest-specific impact than are the new compounds that have been
developed in accordance with modem toxicological testing protocols.").
149. See Sheehy, supra note 21, at 278 (finding that "the Delaney Clause prevents the
replacement of older, more dangerous pesticides with newer, less dangerous pesticides").
Ironically, some of these more hazardous older pesticides are used by organic farmers. See
supra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing natural, but highly hazardous, pesticides
used by organic farmers).
150. Cross, supra note 8, at 924.
151. GRAHAM & WIENER, supra note 49, at 241.
152. STROUP &GOODMAN, supra note 95, at 2. The authors note that in two cases the
California tap water was 50 times riskier than the water from the closed wells. Id.; see also
Bruce N. Ames et al., Ranking Possible Carcinogens: One Approach to Risk Management,
in THE RisK ASSESSMENT OF ENvIRONMENTAL AND HUMAN HEALTH HAzARDS, supra note
75, at 1082, 1086 (noting that only two of thirty-five wells closed presented greater risk than
tap water).
153. Ames et al., supra note 152, at 1086.
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in Woburn, Massachusetts that had fewer carcinogenic substances than
normal tap water.'54 The unilateral application of the precautionary principle
called for closing down the wells at the slightest hint of risk without consid-
eration of the relative risk from alternative drinking sources.
B. Foregone Benefits
Another important unforeseen cost of environmental regulation is the
loss of health benefits from the regulated substance or activity. Like the
risks of alternatives, the health benefits of activities are commonly ignored
when regulation is contemplated. Industry advocates make sure that regula-
tors consider the economic costs of rulemaking, but the health benefits do not
always get such an audience. Yet, the health benefits of products and activi-
ties are often substantial, and ignoring these benefits can produce hazardous
regulation.
A good example of potentially foregone benefits is chlorine. Various
chlorine-based compounds, such as chlorofluorocarbons and PCBs, have been
implicated as environmental hazards. Scientific evidence has mounted to
suggest that the chlorination of public water supplies contributes to the
development of carcinogenic trihalomethanes and consequent risk to all those
drinking from the water supplies.' 5 These and other discoveries have moved
many environmentalists, including those in Greenpeace, to propose a com-
plete ban on chlorine, without respect to the particular compound or usage. 156
While various chlorinated compounds present some risk, the value of a
ban is scientifically dubious. 117 Moreover, a ban could create substantial
154. See Jay H. Lehr, Toxicological Risk Assessment Distortions, in RATIONAL READ-
INGS ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS, supra note 68, at 673, 681.
155. See Kenneth P. Cantor et al., Bladder Cancer, Drinking Water Source, and Tap
Water Consumption: A Case-Control Study, 79 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1269, 1269 (1987)
(discussing evidence of risk of trihalomethane exposure); Kenny S. Crump & Harry A.
Guess, Drinking Water and Cancer: Review of Recent Epidemiological Findings and Assess-
ment of Risks, 3 ANN. REv. PUB. HEALTH 339, 339-56 (1982) (same); see also Proposed
Rules: EPA Drinking Water; National Primary Drinking Water Regulations: Disinfectants
and Disinfection Byproducts, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,668, 38,670-73 (1994); BENARDE, supra note
77, at 465-68 (summarizing evidence of carcinogenicity but characterizing association as
weak).
156. See Ivan Amato, The Crusade Against Chlorine, 261 SCIENCE 152 (July 9, 1993).
Fuierer, supra note 9; William Leiss, "Down and Dirty ": The Use and Abuse of Public Trust
in Risk Communication, 15 RISK ANALYSIS 685, 687 (1995) (referring to Greenpeace
campaign for complete phase-out of chlorine compounds).
157. See Meryl H. Karol, Toxicologic Principles Do Not Support the Banning of Chlor-
ine, 1994 FUNDAMENTAL & APPLIED TOXICOL. 1, 1-2 (1995) (reporting conclusions of Soci-
ety of Toxicology that ban was irresponsible and unscientific). A one thousand page review
of the evidence on chlorination, organochlorines, and other compounds came to a similar
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health risks. A ban on water chlorination would cause far greater mortality
from waterborne bacteria than any deaths caused by trihalomethanes or other
disinfection by-products. Chlorination has not extinguished all risk from
waterborne illness, but the process has eliminated some of the greatest risks,
including cholera and typhus. According to the World Health Organization
(WHO), over nine million people around the world die because their water
is not chlorinated.' When Peru responded to the chlorine scare by halting
the chlorination of their water supply, thousands died of cholera. 159 Not only
would the elimination of chlorination increase overall risk, it would shift the
remaining risks to especially vulnerable populations, because "waterborne
disease can be especially devastating to the elderly and those with immune
system deficiencies such as AIDS. "1" ° The alternatives to chlorination are
not equally effective and may carry their own public health risks."'6 In addi-
tion to the benefits of water chlorination, chlorine is also a component in
many pharmaceuticals employed to treat problems like coronary heart disease
and cancer. Polyvinyl chloride (PVC) may not appear to provide such
direct health benefits, but its prohibition could require increased use of
highly hazardous lead in pipes as well as increased pollution from the manu-
facture of iron. PVC's fire retardant properties may also have saved many
conclusion. The various articles are found in part 2 of 20 REG. TOXICOL. PHARMACOL.
(Aug. 1994).
158. Kenneth Smith, The Media's War on Essential Chemicals: Targeting Chlorine, 6:2
PRIornEs 6, 8 (1994).
159. See Christopher Anderson, Cholera Epidemic Traced to Risk Miscalculation,
NATURE, Nov. 28, 1991, at 255; James Brooke, Cholera Kills 1100 in Peru and Marches
On, Reaching the Brazilian Border, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 19, 1991, at A3; R.I. Glass et al.,
Epidemic Cholera in the Americas, 256 SCIENCE 1524, 1524-25 (June 12, 1992); see also
AMERICAN COUNCIL ON SCIENCE & HEALTH, CHLORINE & HEALTH 6 (Aug. 1995).
160. GRAHAM & WIENER, supra note 49, at 125.
161. See id. at 139 (observing that primary alternative - ozonation - does not control
virological regrowth as well as chlorination and that ozone manufacturing requires additional
energy use, with its own polluting consequences); id. at 140 (pointing out that alternatives
to chlorine also form organic by-products that have been implicated in disease causation);
see also AMERICAN COUNCIL ON SCIENCE & HEALTH, supra note 159, at 6 (reporting that
ozone provides less effective guard against disease and that "there is no assurance that
ozone's by-products, including bromate (an animal carcinogen) will be any less toxic than
by-products produced during chlorination").
162. Smith, supra note 158, at 10-11. These include the only antibiotic currently
effective against hospital staph infections, a newly discovered natural anticancer marine
sponge metabolite, a DDT derivative used to treat inoperable adrenal cancer, and the leading
drug for treatment of testicular cancer. Id.
163. See AmERICAN COUNCILON SCIENCE &HEALTH, supra note 159, at 8 (noting that
"emissions from the iron pipe manufacture would cause more serious environmental
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lives over the past few decades." Banning chlorine would threaten all
these substantial benefits.
Fluoridation provides an episode of foregone benefits due to precau-
tionary local regulations. About forty percent of American people live in
areas where the water contains relatively little fluoride, and where none is
added. 6 This is attributable to "dire predictions for public health because
fluorides are poisonous" and the political power of "anti-technology
forces. "'I The levels of fluoride added to water are low enough to present
no risk and to offer a substantial reduction in dental caries. Yet precaution-
ary public fears fail to consider the benefits and dwell upon the remote hint
of a possibility of a risk.167
One of the best documented examples of foregone health benefits from
precautionary government safety regulation involves FDA requirements for
the introduction of new drugs. The FDA will permit such introduction only
after manufacturers have demonstrated the safety and efficacy of their new
drugs through a series of rigorous tests. These requirements were provoked
in part by public concern over the thalidomide tragedy, in which the intro-
duction of a new drug in Europe apparently caused severe birth defects.
68
The restrictions in the United States have the effect of delaying or prevent-
ing the introduction of new drugs.69 This is the genesis of what has
become known as the "drug lag" in the United States.17 FDA regulation
problems than are caused by emissions from PVC pipe production" and that PVC provides
"noncorroding, lead-free pipe and connections for potable water supplies").
164. See id. at 9 (reporting that "use of PVC in building materials is partly responsible
for the fact that the U.S. death rate from fire has decreased from 76 per million population
in the 1940s, when most construction and decorative products were made of 'natural'
materials, to 29 per million in the 1980s, by which time PVC had replaced natural materials
in many applications").
165. LEWIs, supra note 50, at 41.
166. Id. at 40-41.
167. As an interesting sidebar, Representative James Delaney, the author of the famous
clause, was an "ardent anti-fluoridationist." LEWIS, supra note 50, at 147.
168. See generally HARVEY TEFF & COLIN R. MUNRO, THALIDOMIDE: THE LEGAL
AFTERMATH (1976) (reviewing history of how thalidomide used by pregnant women resulted
in thousands of birth defects cases).
169. See WILLIAM WARDELL & Louis LASAGNA, REGULATION AND DRUG DEVELOP-
MENT 98 (1975) (observing that "beneficial new drugs are introduced more quickly and in
greater numbers in Britain"); William M. Wardell, A Close Inspection of the 'Calm Look',
239 JAMA 2004, 2007 (1978) (reporting study that for nine major therapeutic areas, 43
drugs were introduced in Great Britain and only 14 new drugs were introduced in U.S.).
170. See, e.g., Kenneth I. Kaitin et al., The Drug Lag: An Update of New Drug
Introductions in the United States and in the United Kingdom, 1977 through 1987, 46 CLIN.
PHARMACOL. & THERAPEUTICS 121 (1989) (presenting quantitative evidence of drug lag).
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of new drugs became particularly controversial when it delayed access to
AIDS treatments,' although it remains uncertain whether this graphic
episode of costs of precaution will translate into any broader reform."
Delaying or preventing the introduction of new drugs almost defini-
tionally involves foregone health benefits because health benefits are the
purpose of the drugs. Of course, no one wants to induce unnecessary
thalidomide tragedies, but the great precaution regarding that possibility has
tragically caused substantial health harm. Democratic Representative James
Scheuer of New York charged that the FDA "is contributing to the needless
suffering and death of thousands of Americans because it is denying life-
enhancing and life-saving drugs available elsewhere."" The FDA's
restrictions on the use of beta-blockers reportedly "set back cardiovascular
therapy in this country by years."'74 The FDA Commissioner even con-
ceded that the FDA had delayed the introduction of one drug with the
potential to save seventeen thousand lives each year. 75 Delay of a drug to
prevent bleeding gastric ulcers may have cost in excess of eight thousand
lives annually.' 76 A two-year delay of another drug offering thrombolytic
therapy for heart attacks may have cost twenty-two thousand lives."
Moreover, the strict standards for new drugs are not applied to old drugs,
so failure to approve a new pharmaceutical out of great precaution may
simply prolong the use of a more harmful, older product.' This history
171. Steven R. Salbu, Regulation of Drug Treatments for HIV and AIDS: A Contract-
arian Model of Access 11 YALE J. REG. 401, 410-11 (1994) (discussing pressure put on
FDA by AIDS victims and other interested parties to speed up drug approval process).
172. See Kazman, Death by Regulation, supra note 30, at 19. Kazman noted that the
"AIDS crisis has produced some incremental changes because it is the first time that drug
lag's potential victims have organized themselves into a powerful political constituency."
Id. However, "it is still unclear whether the AIDS-inspired reforms, such as liberalized
distribution of drugs before full approval and more lenient standards for test data, will be
significantly utilized." Id.
173. See John Kelly, Bridging America's Drug Gap, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1981,
(Magazine), at 99-100. The article goes on to detail the story of a doctor who lost a patient
to the drug lag. He reports that "[s]he was a sturdy, healthy-appearing black woman and
so she [remained] at the time of her death when she turned to her husband, gasped and fell
to the floor dead." Id. at 101. She suffered from Prinzmetal angina, which was treatable
by a new drug available in England and Germany, but denied to U.S. patients for lack of
FDA approval. Id.
174. Wardell, supra note 169, at 2010.
175. JOHN URQUHART & KLAUS HEILMAN, RISK WATCH 118 (1984) (quoting FDA
Commissioner Arthur Hayes).
176. Kazman, Deadly Overcaution, supra note 30, at 43.
177. Id. at 44.
178. WARDELL& LASAGNA, supra note 169, at 100 (reporting on study of adverse drug
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does not mean that the United States should allow new drugs to be mar-
keted without any screening, but does demonstrate that application of the
precautionary principle to potential risks of new drugs will cause more
mortality and morbidity than it prevents. One of the drugs cited by FDA
advocates, practolol, was kept off the market because of toxicity concerns
without regard to the far greater benefits the drug could provide to heart
patients. 179 Precautionary fears of possible risk from new drugs may well
have cost thousands of premature deaths.
Pesticides offer another case of significant foregone benefits as a con-
sequence of regulation. The Natural Resources Defense Council and the
television program 60 Minutes teamed up to spread fears of Alar, a growth
hormone used on apples."t ° The resultant media-fed fear was considerable.
In the wake of this scare, "millions of consumers stopped buying apples and
apple products," 8' and apples were withdrawn from school lunchrooms. 82
Yet the risk from Alar was somewhere between miniscule and nonexis-
tent, and by foregoing apple consumption, consumers lost health benefits
reactions in New Zealand - where there are fewer restrictions than U.S. - which found
that older drugs caused most of fatalities, and newer drugs were relatively safer).
179. See GRABowsKI & VERNON, supra note 22, at 44, 46 (noting that despite
practolol's "known toxicity," it has "an extremely high benefit-to-risk ratio when used to
prevent heart attacks and coronary death"). The authors suggest that use of the drug could
prevent more than 10,000 deaths per year in the United States. Id.
180. See WILDAVSKY, supra note 26, at 202-04 (summarizing nature of media campaign
against Alar). The entire effort was part of a "skillfully organized public relations cam-
paign." Id. at 204. Even Meryl Streep was called in to publicize the asserted threat, and
Alar was eventually proscribed by the EPA. Id.
181. Rosen, supra note 116, at 85.
182. 135 CONG. REc. E2237 (daily ed. June 21, 1989) (remarks of Rep. Hamilton)
(reporting that "apples were removed from many school lunchrooms ... and some families
poured apple juice down the drain").
183. The World Health Organization (WHO) concluded that Alar was not carcinogenic.
See, e.g., Eliot Marshall, A Is for Apple, Alar and... Alarmist?, 254 SCIENCE 20, 20
(Oct. 4, 1991). The EPA's own Scientific Advisory Panel (SAP) rejected the agency's
proposed ban on daminozide, concluding that the data were insufficient to demonstrate
carcinogenicity. See WILDAVSKY, supra note 26, at 211 (quoting SAP's conclusion that data
were "inadequate to perform a qualitative risk assessment" on potential carcinogenicity of
substance, much less quantitative risk assessment on relative degree of risk). An expert
panel appointed by the British government concluded that prevailing exposures to Alar posed
"no risk to health." Id. at 214. The EPA continues to maintain that Alar presents a risk
of cancer, but did eventually reduce its risk estimate by about half. See Marshall, supra,
at 21. The journal editorialized that "a clearly dubious report about possible carcinogenicity
by a special interest group was hyped by a news organization without the most simple
checks on its reliability or documentation." Daniel Koshland, Credibility in Science and the
Press, 254 SCIENCE 629, 629 (Nov. 1, 1991); see also Kenneth W. Weinstein, When
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including protection from heart disease and cancer.'
Controversies over pesticide use commonly result in foregone health
benefits from consumption of foods. Democratic Representative Lee Ham-
ilton lamented that consumers have reduced "consumption of fresh produce
because of pesticide worries," even though "increasing consumption of
fruits and vegetables can help reduce the risk of some cancers, with benefits
far outweighing possible cancer risks from the pesticides."" It is simply
not wise to counsel consumers not to eat their spinach, although some
environmentalists do precisely that. The actual risk from pesticide residues
on food is quite small.
The risk of foregone health benefits from fruit and vegetable consump-
tion is demonstrated in a recent report by the Environmental Working
Group (EWG), which cautioned consumers to avoid such products as straw-
berries, bell peppers, and spinach, due to pesticide residues.'86 The forty-
five page report by EWG takes note of the health benefits of these food
products and recommends substitutes." s The recommendation of substitutes
shows some responsibility, but is plainly insufficient. First, many consum-
ers will hear only the word about the products with the highest pesticide
residues and may never get the message about the need to substitute.
Second, consumers may resist substitution - those who like spinach may
not care for brussels sprouts or other alternatives. Third, the substitutes
may not provide all the benefits of the products cautioned against. Straw-
berries may offer greater health benefits than the alternatives. 88 Spinach
Pesticides Go Public: Regulating Pesticides by Media after Alar, in PESTICIDE RESIDUES AND
FOOD SAFETY, supra note 102, at 277, 281 (reporting that "[flormer Surgeon General C.
Everett Koop, John Weisburger of the American Health Foundation, former FDA Commis-
sioner Dr. Frank E. Young, the Director of the California Department of Health Services,
the Institute of Food Technologists, Dr. Bruce Ames of the University of California, and
others expressed the view that the consumption of apples with Alar was safe and that the
trace amounts found in apples were toxicologically insignificant").
184. See JEAN CARPER, FOOD PHARMACY 114-17 (1988) (surveying research on health
benefits of apple consumption).
185. Remarks of Rep. Hamilton, supra note 182, at E2237.
186. See Environmental Working Group, A Shopper's Guide to Pesticides in Produce
(Nov. 1995). This report is available by mail or at <http://www.ewg.orglpublhomel
Reports/Shoppers/Shoppers.html>. Environmental Working Group's (EWG's) home page
is at <http://www.ewg.org>.
187. Id. at 26. The substitutes recommended for strawberries include blueberries,
raspberries, oranges, watermelon, and other fruits. Recommended substitutes for spinach
included broccoli, brussels sprouts, romaine lettuce, or asparagus. Id.
188. See CARPER, supra note 184, at 283 (reporting that "strawberries capped a list of
eight foods most linked to lower rates of cancer deaths among a group of 1271 elderly
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is a uniquely healthy food, offering more benefits than its substitutes.189
EWG also counsels against eating Chilean grapes, "a rich storehouse of
antioxidant, anticancer compounds,' but only substitutes U.S. grapes
when in season (apparently they would forego the health benefits for six
months of the year)."' EWG cautions against apples, suggesting that just
about any fruit or vegetable would be more nutritious, but this ignores
many health benefits of apple consumption."9 In exchange for all these
health benefits, EWG does not even identify the benefits of pesticide
avoidance. The report contains a very elaborate comparison of pesticide
residues on various products,"9 but nowhere attempts to estimate the
magnitude of risk from these residues."9 A table in the report acknowl-
edges that the residues are extremely low, in the parts per billion or even
parts per hundred billion range."9  The report additionally ignores the
finding that "[flruits that are inadequately protected against pests have also
Americans in New Jersey").
189. See Environmental Working Group, supra note 186, at 26 (acknowledging that
spinach provides anticarcinogenic lutein that is "not abundant in these substitutes"). Spinach
contains "about four times more beta carotene and three times more lutein than broccoli."
JEAN CARPER, FOOD - YOUR MIRACLE MEDICINE 474 (1993). Spinach also contains more
beta carotene than raw carrots, and "spinach's panoply of other carotenoids may possess
anticancer activity, and may be even more responsible than beta carotene for spinach's
splendid showing in population surveys of cancer-preventive foods." CARPER, supra note
184, at 279.
190. CARPER, supra note 189, at 481.
191. See Environmental Working Group, supra note 186, at 26 (recommending
consumption of U.S. grapes only from May to December to avoid pesticide residues).
192. See id. at 27 (apparently considering only vitamin C content and carotenoids as
health benefits). Apples offer other valuable constituents: "Whole fresh apples may help
ward off cancer because they are shot through with caffeic or chlorogenic acid, which
blocks cancer formation in lab animals dosed with potent carcinogens." CARPER, supra note
184, at 117. Apples may also lower cholesterol. Id. at 474.
193. Environmental Working Group, supra note 186, at 29-41.
194. EWG notes that consumers have "a right to know how slim the knowledge base
really is when it comes to predicting the true risks of pesticides and pesticide combinations
on human health." Id. at 29. This is another invocation of the precautionary principle -
if we do not know the answer, avoid the product. Yet one must wonder why consumers
should forego fruits and vegetables that fight cancer, according to a substantial knowl-
edge base, simply because a slim knowledge base exists about the risk from those prod-
ucts.
195. Id. at 13. The most hazardous of the pesticides, parathion, was found in average
residue at only two parts per hundred billion. Id. Even these estimates of miniscule
exposure may overstate the risk. One recent study of eight carcinogenic pesticides "found
that actual human exposures in food had been overestimated by factors of 99,000 to
463,000." HARVARD CTR. FOR RISK ANALYSIS, RISK IN PERSPECTIVE, Mar. 1995, at 1.
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been shown to have lower nutritional value (e.g., less vitamin C in apples)
than are fruits that are protected by pesticides. "196
While the foregone benefits from food consumption are generally
traced to consumer fears of pesticides, government regulation can have a
similar consequence. Scientists from the National Cancer Institute warned
that a strict interpretation of the Delaney Clause could increase risk because
"[b]y outlawing pesticides and making it more difficult to grow fruits and
vegetables, prices would rise and demand could fall for foods that have
been shown to prevent cancer, such as broccoli and carrots." 1" The antici-
pated banning of thirty-five additional pesticides under that law is antici-
pated to cost $1.2 billion, which will be passed on to consumers.' Ele-
mentary economics informs us that reduced supply and higher cost will
yield reduced consumption of fruits and vegetables that can play a major
role in cancer prevention' and other forms of health enhancement. 2' An
economic study concluded that the total elimination of pesticide use on
fruits and vegetables would increase prices from 11 % (fresh vegetables) to
52.5 % (fresh fruits) and reduce consumption by a significant amount. 1
196. HARvARD CTR. FOR RISK ANALYSIS, supra note 195, at 2.
197. Sheehy, supra note 21, at 275 n.191.
198. Id. at 275-76.
199. See Gladys Block et al., Fruit, Vegetables, and Cancer Prevention: A Review of
the Epidemiological Evidence, 18 NUTRrroN & CANCER 1, 20 (1992) (reporting that "the
evidence of an association between fruit and vegetable consumption and cancer prevention
is exceptionally strong and consistent"). Research finds a protective effect against cancers
of the lung, larynx, mouth, esophagus, stomach, colon, rectum, bladder, pancreas, cervix,
ovaries, and breast. Sheehy, supra note 21, at 276-77 and sources cited therein.
200. See HARvARD CTR. FOR RISK ANALYSIS, supra note 195, at 2 (observing that
banning pesticides would most hurt poor by raising food prices). The authors note that:
A recent study in the journal Science indicated that the increase in food prices
from bans of pesticides could be quite substantial. For poor families and house-
holds on fixed incomes, higher food prices increase the risk of malnutrition and
its associated illnesses. In short, banning numerous pesticides may have the same
effect on poor people as reducing their food stamp payments!
Id.
201. See Taylor, supra note 109, at 15 (finding 12.2% reduction in fresh vegetable
consumption, 14.7% reduction in frozen vegetable consumption, 10.4% reduction in canned
vegetable consumption, 25.5% reduction in fresh fruit consumption, 26% decrease in frozen
fruit consumption, and 22.9% reduction in dried fruit consumption). In some respects, these
average reductions actually underestimate the importance of pesticides to food production.
In some cases, pesticides are not critical to production in the normal year, but the option to
use the chemicals is essential to respond to atypical conditions. See Gianessi, supra note
102, at 26 (noting that only one percent of Illinois soybeans need pesticide treatment in
typical year but 1988 drought conditions caused particular pest infestation that required
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Moreover, the banning of pesticides can actually obstruct Integrated Pest
Management programs aimed at reducing overall chemical usage, thereby
increasing net agrichemical application. 2
DDT presents a prominent case of substantial foregone benefits from
regulation. While an EPA hearing examiner found no good scientific evi-
dence of public health risk from DDT, 3 the substance was banned by the
agency, in part because of its environmental persistence and apparent threat
to wildlife. The adverse consequences for farm workers were observed
above, but the DDT ban also produced serious foregone benefits on an inter-
national scale. Countries around the globe had used DDT to eradicate or at
least control insect-borne diseases, particularly malaria. These countries
followed U.S. action in prohibiting or restricting the use of DDT. At the
time of the ban, malaria "was close to being eradicated." I Malaria experi-
enced a resurgence after DDT was banned and currently causes millions of
treatment of 40 percent of crop). Farmers are increasingly seeking to cut back on the use
of pesticides (which, after all, cost money) and are tailoring usage to only necessary con-
ditions. Id. at 26-27.
202: Patrick Weddle, Pesticide-Free Tree Fruit Crops: Can We Meet Consumer De-
mands?, in PESTICIDE RESIDUES AND FOOD SAFETY, supra note 102, at 58, 63 (reporting
that "[s]ingle issue legislative and regulatory efforts aimed at restricting the use of pesticides
at the national and state levels have created vacuums that may actually be increasing the
reliance on pesticides and other petrochemical inputs"). Weddle notes that pest "resistance
management" is a crucial component of an Integrated Pest Management system so that "to
reduce reliance on pesticides, practitioners will, paradoxically, need the appropriate uses of
a broad selection of pesticidal products." Id.
203. See Richard F. Sanford, Environmentalism and the Assault on Reason, in RA-
TIONAL READINGS ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS, supra note 68, at 16-17 (observing
that court-appointed hearings examiner and "independent scientists" found no justification
for ban, but Administrator William Ruckelshaus proceeded with action anyway). The back-
ground to the DDT ban is discussed in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus,
439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The original studies suggesting that DDT might cause
cancer were tainted by contamination with the known powerful carcinogen, aflatoxin.
WILDAVSKY, supra note 26, at 416. " Other than the aflatoxin-contamination study, no
other study had found DDT to be such an animal carcinogen. 1d. at 416, 424. Long after
the ban, some evidence arose that DDT might cause breast cancer, and this research
received considerable press attention. However, follow-up research suggested that the initial
correlation was spurious and that there was no connection between DDT and cancer. See
Austin, supra note 94, at 43 (1989) (finding no connection between DDT and cancer);
see also Liess, supra note 156, at 688 (observing that studies "do not indicate an associa-
tion between breast cancer and serum organochlorines"). Moreover, the study that sug-
gested that DDT might be linked with higher levels of breast cancer actually found that
PCBs appeared to have a protective effect that reduced breast cancer incidence. See
generally Stephen S. Sternberg, DDT and Breast Cancer, 86 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1094
(1994).
204. Sanford, supra note 203, at 20.
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deaths each year throughout the world.' ° This mortal enormity is at least
partially attributable to the decision to prohibit the use of DDT. °1 6 In this
case, the United States has been fortunate to feel few of the foregone health
benefits from DDT use, but the worldwide impact was immense. Other
pesticides also offer substantial health benefits through disease control.'
The banning of DDT also had significant adverse effects on natural
habitat preservation. Use of DDT had made the eradication of the gypsy
moth in the eastern United States "imminent. "20 After the pesticide's pro-
hibition, the moth "staged a spectacular comeback," as biological control
efforts were ineffective.' The moth "defoliated 13 million acres of prime
woodland across the Northeast, primarily in New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. "1o In other words,
banning DDT resulted in substantial deforestation.
Pesticide use has other significant environmental benefits not considered
by critics. Use of these chemicals is crucial for high-yield agriculture, at
least for the near future. The Council for Agricultural Science and Tech-
nology estimated that crop production would decline by 30% in the absence
of such pesticides.2" These figures are disputed, of course, because many
argue that sustainable agriculture, using more traditional farming techniques,
could provide ample food.2"2 Even if they are correct, such low input
205. RAY & Guzzo, supra note 75, at 17. The authors noted that DDT reduced
malaria cases in Sri Lanka from 2.8 million to only 17, but incidence grew back to about
2.5 million after the ban. Id. at 69. They also quote Dr. Samuel Simmons, chief of the
technology branch of the Communicable Disease Center of the U.S. Public Health Service
to the effect that the "total value of DDT to mankind is inestimable" in "protection from
infectious diseases and pestiferous insects or indirectly by better nutrition, cleaner food, and
increased disease resistance." Id. at 69-70.
206. See GRAHAM & WIENER, supra note 49, at 174.
207. See BENARDE, supra note 77, at 145 (observing that "[b]efore chemical insecti-
cides were introduced, hundreds of thousands of people died each year from a host of insect-
borne diseases").
208. Id. at 155.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 154.
211. See John Picket, Safer Insecticides: Development and Use, CHEMISTRY & INDUS-
TRY, Jan. 6, 1992, at 25.
212. Some may challenge the benefits of pesticides on the grounds that the insect targets
will develop a resistance to the chemicals and render applications ineffective in the long-
term. While there is some truth in the concern over resistance, it is often overstated. See,
e.g., EASTERBROOK, supra note 4, at 79 (noting that "while some pest species have devel-
oped a vexing resistance to man's chemicals, most have not; the resistant portion may be
far less than one percent"). Even when targets develop resistance, the pesticide may provide
substantial short-run benefits.
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techniques require far more land to produce the same amount of food.
Axiomatically, lower yields per acre require more acres for the same total
production. This is evident from current experience with organically
grown produce.21 3 In turn, greater land use means increased destruction
of natural habitats. Therefore, "[flor those of us who wish to preserve the
planet's diversity of species, high-tech, chemically-assisted agriculture is
an environmentalist's best friend."214 If we returned to the crop yields that
existed without the use of fertilizer and pesticides, maintaining total
production levels would mean "plowing down the land equivalent of North
America in addition to South America," so that "high-yield farming is
saving 10 million square miles of wildlife habitat right now."2"5 It is also
noteworthy that "traditional and organic farmers suffer the highest rates of
soil erosion per ton of food output," while use of herbicides with reduced
tillage can cut soil erosion from fifty to ninety-eight percent. z6 None of
this makes the case for apotheosizing pesticides or striving to maximize
chemical use. Pesticides cost money, and farmers therefore have an
appropriate incentive to reduce their use as much as possible, within
production constraints. The importance of recognizing the benefits of
213. See Dennis Avery, Saving the Planet with Pesticides: Increasing Food Supplies
While Preserving the Earth's Biodiversity, in THE TRUE STATE OF THE PLANET, supra note
49, at 49, 70 (noting reductions in yield and reporting that organic yields for carrots de-
clined 40%); Ronald Bailey, Rebuttal, GARBAGE, Fall 1994, at 51 (observing that "a recent
survey of seven European countries, where organic farming is widespread, finds that organic
yields are typically just two-thirds of those achieved by using modem agrochemicals, e.g.,
wheat (65%), potatoes (60%), sunflowers (70%)); F.L. McEwen, Food Production - The
Challenge for Pesticides, 28 BIOSCIENCE 773, 776 (1978) (suggesting that "were it not for
pesticides, crops such as apples and most of our tender fruits and many vegetables, including
onions and cold crops, would not be available in quantity, and the price would be exces-
sively high"); David Pimentel et al., Benefits and Costs of Pesticide Use in U.S. Food
Production, 28 BIOSCIENCE 772, 772 (1978) (comparing yields and finding substantial bene-
fits to insecticide use).
214. Ronald Bailey, Once and Future Farming Environmentalists Who Want To Preserve
Wildlands from the Farmer's Plow As We Feed a Burgeoning Human Population Should
Reconsider an Old Enemy: Chemical-Based Agriculture, GARBAGE, Fall 1994, at 42; Bailey,
supra note 49, at 5 (observing that if "poor countries do not adopt modem high-yield
agriculture, for example, then their impoverished farmers will be forced by hunger to level
millions of square miles of wildlands").
215. Avery, supra note 213, at 72. Norman Borlaug, the 1970 Nobel laureate, stated
that without high-yield agriculture, "[e]ither people would have starved or the increases in
food output would have been realized by drastic expansion of acres under cultivation -
losses of pristine land 100 times greater than all losses to urban and suburban expansion
combined." Quoted in EASTERBROOK, supra note 4, at 13.
216. Avery, supra note 213, at 74.
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pesticide use is to caution against presumptive application of the precau-
tionary principle to pesticide risks without considering lost benefits.
Food additive regulation presents another case of foregone benefits.
Few have much positive to say about artificial additives, which are per-
ceived as potentially risky and trivially beneficial.2"7 Yet, additives such
as preservatives definitionally prevent spoilage with attendant savings in
food quantity and disease prevention. Nitrites used in curing bacon and
other meats became controversial as a cause of cancer, but the additives
were used to prevent botulism, a fatal disease." 8 Additives may have
other benefits as well; some of the preservatives added to food happen to
be antioxidants that actually prevent the development of intestinal cancers,
yet these benefits are unappreciated. Although the risk from food addi-
tives is immaterial, public fears have caused abandonment of some addi-
tives such as BHA and BHT. Yet, "[s]ome cancer epidemiologists believe
that the decline in the human death rate from stomach cancer since the
1940s - when the widespread use of BHA and BHT began - may
actually in part be a result of the increased use of these two additives."2 9
Animal studies have confirmed this beneficial effect of the additives,
finding that BHA and BHT may also prevent colon cancer 220 and breast
cancer." This occurs because the additives sequester and control the
formation of free oxygen radicals, which have been implicated as a source
of cancer. Such "dietary control of oxygen radical damage could add, on
average, five or more years to our life. " m When nitrites and nitrates
217. See, e.g., Sheehy, supra note 21, at 269 (discussing legislative history and finding
that "Congress considered color additives of questionable value").
218. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DOES NITRITE CAUSE CANCER? CON-
CERNS ABOUT THE VALIDITY OF FDA-SPONSORED STUDY DELAY ANSWER 9 (Jan. 31, 1980).
Moreover, the elimination of nitrites and nitrates from cured meats would not even signifi-
cantly reduce human exposure to these potentially toxic substances. About 80% of human
consumption of nitrates comes from natural constituents in vegetables. BENARDE, supra note
77, at 71.
219. Fredrick J. Stare, Perceptions of Food Safety Issues in the United States, in RATIO-
NAL READINGS IN ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS, supra note 68, at 522, 526; see also Huber,
supra note 124, at 297 (stating that "there is growing evidence that some antioxidant preserva-
tives inhibit the formation of certain active natural carcinogens, and so may actually contribute
to the decline in mortality from stomach cancer").
220. Bandaru Reddy et al., Effect of Various Levels of Dietary Butylated Hydroxyanisole
on Methylazoxymethyl Acetate-Induced Colon Carcinogenesis in CF1 Mice, 71 J. NAT'L
CANCER INST. 1200 (1983).
221. L.A. Cohen et al., Inhibition of Chemically Induced Mammary Carcinogens in Rates
by Long-Term Exposure to Butylated Hydroxytoluene, 76 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 721 (1986).
222. BENARDE, supra note 77, at 84.
53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 851 (1996)
themselves were subjected to further study based on evidence of their
carcinogenicity, the research found that low levels of exposure appeared
to protect humans from cancer.' Selenium additives were banned thirty
years ago under the Delaney Clause in light of animal tests revealing
carcinogenicity, but selenium now appears to have a net effect as an
anticarcinogen.' Just as an environmental mindset rejects the concept of
natural carcinogens, it may find inconceivable the prospect that a synthetic
chemical might prevent cancer. Yet, the same animal studies relied on to
diagnose carcinogenic properties of chemicals often demonstrate a protec-
tive effect for studied chemicals.2' Notwithstanding this finding, the
precautionary principle is applied to prohibit food additives based on even
a remote risk of harm, while we remain oblivious to associated foregone
health benefits of the additives.
Another serious case of foregone benefits resulting from consumer
fear involves food irradiation. Microbial contamination of food with
cainplylobacter, salmonella, and other pathogens is a serious public health
problem, causing hundreds of thousands of food poisoning cases every
year.226 Perhaps nine thousand Americans die annually from such food-
borne diseases.' Irradiating foods like raw chicken can prevent many of
these cases. 2 8 Widespread use of food irradiation has been blocked,
however, by environmentalists and food safety activists who stress the
223. See id. at 73 (summarizing results of research by Oxford's Imperial Cancer
Research Fund). The researchers found less gastric mortality among those with higher
nitrate/nitrite levels of saliva. They concluded that "nitrates or something associated with
them exert a protective effect" on gastric cancers. Id.
224. See generally James E. Oldfield, The Two Faces of Selenium, 117 J. NUTRITION
2002 (1987) (discussing selenium's positive and negative effects).
225. Thomas S. Davies & Alastair Munro, The Rodent Carcinogenicity Bioassay
Produces a Similar Frequency of Tumor Increases and Decreases: Implications for Risk
Assessment, 20 REG. ToxICOL. PHARMACOL. 281 (1994). This survey of studies conducted
by the National Toxicology Program between 1990 and 1993 found that two-thirds of
the studied chemicals showed increases in some tumors and over 80% of the studies showed
decreases in tumors. Two significant points emerge: First, many chemicals appear to
decrease cancer, at least at some sites. Second, the same chemical may both increase
and decrease tumors. This considerably complicates application of the precautionary prin-
ciple.
226. See Ronald Krystynak, Control of Microbial Pathogens in Poultry by Irradiation:
Issues Related to Risks and Benefits, in NEw RISKS: ISSUES AND MANAGEMENT 111, 114
(Louis A. Cox, Jr. & Paolo F. Ricci eds., 1990); see also BENARDE, supra note 77, at 35-
63 (discussing health risks from microbial food poisoning).





possibility of health risks from irradiation, even if unproven." Food
irradiation has been used in thirty-seven countries for a number of years
with no adverse health effects, according to the WHO."3 Yet this evi-
dence is no answer to the precautionary principle, which requires only a
hint of a risk of a harm. Of course, this approach ignores the demonstra-
bly greater health benefits from irradiation and the risks from any alterna-
tives to irradiation 31
Another flurry of precautionary concern arose over food additives for
cows. The industry administered the hormone diethylstilbestrol (DES) to
cattle to stimulate weight gain or to increase milk production. DES
became controversial when research demonstrated that its use as a human
drug caused cancer in succeeding generations. With respect to cattle feed,
however, "no evidence showed that the levels of DES present in edible
tissue could actually cause cancer," but the FDA Commissioner prohibited
such use after "requiring that manufacturers show that such residues were
safe." 2  The ban on DES had the effect of increasing the feed required
for each animal by seven to twelve percent and lengthening the time
required in the feedlot. 3 These increases resulting from the ban of DES
withdrew grain from direct human consumption and raised the cost of
beef. Environmentalists who resist giving other hormones to dairy cows
to increase milk production ignore the prospect that "lower milk prices
would have a much more powerful health effect on poverty-sensitive poor
children. "I Increased efficiency provided by the hormones again would
229. See Michael Fumento, Irradiation: A Winning Recipe for Wholesome Beef, 6:2
PRioRrrmEs 37, 37-39 (1994).
230. Id. at 38-39; see also Ari Byrnjolfsson, Wholesomeness of Irradiated Foods: A
Review, 7 J. FOOD SAFETY 107, 120 (1985) (concluding that animal studies at many
laboratories and radiation chemistry data demonstrate that food irradiation is not harmful).
In the United States, astronauts routinely eat irradiated food. See Lee, supra note 227. The
American Medical Association's Council on Scientific Affairs has also concluded that irradi-
ation is a safe and effective process that increases the safety of food.
231. See Fumento, supra note 229, at 39 (observing that alternative means of food
preservation, including smoking, pickling, and salting have been linked to higher death rates
and cancer of esophagus).
232. See Degnan & Flamm, supra note 57, at 243. There was hardly a case to be made
for any risk from DES fed to livestock, because "DES is excreted in the feces, unchanged
chemically, which means that it does not remain in the tissue as residue." BENARDE, supra
note 77, at 84.
233. LESTER B. LAVE, THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL REGULATION 77-78 (1981).
234. KAUFMAN, supra note 116, at 155. The hormone in question, BST, "produced
no evidence of even mild carcinogenicity" in years of animal trials and "break[s] down in
the stomach into harmless constituent chemicals." EASTERBROOK, supra note 4, at 119.
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help protect natural habitats. 35
Another general health risk arising from one-sided use of the precau-
tionary principle arises from hormesis. Hormesis occurs when a substance
presenting a mortality risk at high levels of exposure actually protects
against death or disease at low levels of exposure. The concept suggests
that reducing high levels of exposure to hazardous substances will be
beneficial, but attempts to eliminate all exposure would be counterproduc-
tive. Unfortunately, the precautionary principle suggests that all reduc-
tions should be encouraged and elimination of exposure the goal.
Evidence of hormesis first arose in the context of radiation exposures.
Studies in animals and among Japanese survivors of the atomic bomb
seemed to indicate that those with relatively low radiation exposure actu-
ally lived longer than wholly unexposed populations. 6 Other studies of
radiation exposure have confirmed this effect." While much of the
research has centered on radiation effects, a number of other studies have
found a hormetic effect for exposures to chemicals. Hormesis has been
identified for many regulated substances, including various pesticides,
The American Academy of Pediatrics declared BST safe because it showed no adverse
health effects after a decade of testing. Id.
235. See EASTERBROOK, supra note 4, at 391 (reporting that "[t]hrough increased
productivity hundreds of thousands of acres of dairy land have been returned to nature in
New York in the last half century, offsetting urban expansion even in that overdeveloped
state").
236. Harold Boxenbaum et al., Hormesis, Gompertz Functions, and Risk Assessment,
19 DRUG METABOLISM REVIEWS 195 (1988) (summarizing some studies of radiation
hormesis); M.K. Loken & L.E. Feinendegen, Radiation Hormesis: Its Emerging Sign i-
cance in Medical Practice, 28 INVESTIGATORY RADIOLOGY 446 (1993) (same). The data
are not limited to the natural experiment resulting from the bombing. Ray and Guzzo write
that:
[S]imilar results keep accumulating. In 1980; Professor T.D. Luckey published
the conclusions from 1,239 separate studies of many investigators involving
living things from cell cultures and bacteria to plans (800 references) and animals
(200 references) of many different species exposed to varying amounts of ioniz-
ing radiation of all types. He reports that the results are consistent: There is a
threshold or cutoff point below which ionizing radiation is either harmless or
beneficial. Luckey concluded that ionizing radiation is generally stimulating in
low doses; that low doses give accelerated development, increased resistance to
disease, greater reproductivity, and longer life span ....
RAY & Guzzo, supra note 75, at 111.
237. See BENARDE, supra note 77, at 391 (reporting that "ample evidence supports the
idea that low doses of whole-body radiation reduce ttmor induction," such as evidence that
"low doses of radiation administered to mice resulted in a five-fold reduction in the inci-
dence of leukemia").
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PCBs, heavy metals, and chlorinated hydrocarbons. 8 One review of
scientific studies on both animals and humans from 1974 to 1987 found
twenty-nine studies that demonstrated hormetic effects. 9 Research has
shown a hormetic effect from exposure to low levels of trichloroethylene,
a common hazardous constituent of waste sites, yet Superfund cleanups
have sought to erase all traces of trichloroethylene from these sites.2'
Hormesis turns the precautionary principle and many current regula-
tory approaches upon their heads. The precautionary linear models used
by agencies for extrapolating risks simply assume no hormetic effect and
assume that low levels carry a risk relative to the proportion of exposure.
If very high exposures, such as maximum tolerated doses, cause harm, the
model assumes without demonstration that much lower doses are also
hazardous. Yet hormesis indicates that high levels may be harmful while
low levels are beneficial. The precautionary principle and linear risk as-
sessment extrapolation would require striving to eliminate the beneficial
lower doses as well. The evidence for hormesis may not be so strong as
to justify increasing human exposures to low level radiation, but it should
be sufficient to dejustify expensive efforts to reduce such exposures.
The existence of hormesis is not indisputable. The difficulties of
producing conclusive research at such low exposure levels confounds cer-
tainty. The precautionary principle might counsel that we ignore hormesis
given this uncertainty. Such a one-sided application of the precautionary
principle would be remarkably illogical, however. The quantitative risk
assessments that suggest there are health risks at low levels are highly
uncertain and share the same limitations as the hormesis studies. An
examination of the data suggests some uncertainty about the presence of
health benefits from low exposures and uncertainty about the presence of
health risks at such exposures. A choice to emphasize the uncertain health
risks while ignoring the uncertain health benefits reflects some agenda
other than public health protection.
238. See Edward Calabrese et al., The Occurrence of Chemically Induced Hormesis,
52 HEALTH PHYSICS 531 (1987) (reviewing studies of chemical hormesis); Edward Calabrese
& L.A. Baldwin, Possible Examples of Chemical Hormesis in a Previously Published Study,
13 J. APPLIED Tox. 169 (1993) (same).
239. J. Michael Davis & David L. Svendsgaard, U-Shaped Dose Response Curves:
Their Occurrence and Implications for Risk Assessment, 30 J. TOXICOL. & ENVTL. HEALTH
71 (1990).
240. Teruo Nagaya et al., Subclinical and Reversible Hepatic Effects of Occupational
Exposure to Trichloroethylene, 74 INT'L ARCHIVE OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. HEALTH 561
(1993).
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C. Risks of Remediation
Harm may be caused directly by the implementation of the environ-
mental regulation itself. Measures taken to prevent a risk inadvertently
may increase the level of that same risk. Consider the wings of an air-
plane. Obviously, these wings need to be strong, but only up to a point.
Efforts to continue to add strength to the wings can make a plane less safe
by adding weight and hindering maneuverability."4 Beyond a certain
point, added precautions reduce overall safety.
Additional risks from remediation have recurred in environmental and
public health protection. Efforts to remove indoor asbestos-containing
products provide an example of such counterproductive controls. A public
panic arose from the discovery of asbestos in buildings such as schools.
The precautionary principle is particularly compelling with regard to
children, and the panic produced demands to compel the removal of all
asbestos-containing products from schools and some other buildings.
There is little doubt that breathing asbestos fibers can be distinctly hazard-
ous to health, causing cancer and other fatal lung diseases.
The mere presence of asbestos-containing materials in buildings,
however, did not necessarily create a risk. The actual exposure level in
most public buildings, including schools, that contained asbestos was very
low - about 0.0001 fibers per milliliter of air.242 This is about the same
concentration that is found outdoors, 3 suggesting that the indoor materials
may not have been independently responsible for any exposure and there-
fore not responsible for any risk. Rather than rely on the measurements
and risk assessments, however, schools employed the precautionary
principle to remove the asbestos-containing materials without regard to
actual risk.
In many cases, removal of asbestos-containing materials was foolish
and created a health risk. Asbestos fibers are only hazardous when
floating in the air and breathed in. Asbestos contained behind a wall or
ceiling cannot be breathed. Removal operations disrupted this asbestos
and exposed it to the air. Removal eliminated the bulky asbestos-contain-
ing products but could not capture every miniscule fiber that flaked off.
241. LEWIS, supra note 50, at 113.
242. See HEALTH EFFECTS INST., ASBESTOS IN PUBLIC AND COMMERCIAL BUILDINGS
4-81 (1991).
243. A recent survey found that "fiber concentrations from recent studies in buildings
are comparable to levels in the outdoor air, a point surely relevant to assessing the health
risk of asbestos in buildings." B.T. Mossman, et al., Asbestos: Scientific Development and
Implications for Public Policy, 247 SCIENCE 294, 299 (Jan. 19, 1990).
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Many of these fibers settled to the floor. When students returned to the
building, they disrupted the fibers that settled to the floor, and these fibers
became resuspended in the air.2' Removal operations shifted asbestos
fibers into the breathable air. Studies consistently found that exposures to
asbestos were higher after removal than they had been before.245 The as-
bestos removal also created some additional risk for the workers involved
in the removal process.
Much like asbestos, lead is an undeniably hazardous. substance, yet
efforts at its removal can increase the hazards it presents. A study of the
Massachusetts Department of Public Health's Childhood Lead Poisoning
Prevention Program found that the "process of deleading lead-painted
buildings may cause a substantial increase in ambient lead levels."246
Other studies have come to a similar conclusion.247 Removal also creates
dangerous lead exposure levels among workers and even their children.24
The potential hazards of lead paint removal do not dejustify all efforts at
removal,249 but the risks caution for carefully targeted action, not blind
pursuit of the precautionary principle.
244. The National Institute of Building Sciences observed that "whether the removal
process involves wet or dry disruption of the in-place asbestos, data shows that a substantial
quantity becomes resuspended and recirculated throughout the building." Michael Fumento,
The Asbestos Rip-Off, AM. SPECTATOR, Oct. 1989, at 21, 25.
245. See Frank B. Cross, Asbestos in Schools: A Remonstrance Against Panic, 11 COL.
J. ENVTL. L. 73, 92 (1986). Dr. Robert Sawyer of Yale suggested that the one-sided per-
ception of hazard caused the "stampeding of local school administrators into . . . a chaotic
situation that can actually increase the hazard presented by asbestos-bearing products." Quoted
in id. at 89; see also LEWIS, supra note 50, at 167 (emphasizing that "expert consensus is that
the best thing that can be done for the children is to leave the stuff alone unless it is exposed
and friable, not to release it into the atmosphere in a clumsy effort to get rid of it").
246. Yona Amitai et al., Residential Deleading: Effects on the Blood Lead Levels of Lead-
Poisoned Children, 88 PEDIATRICS 893, 896 (1991).
247. Susan Rey-Alvarez & Theresa Menke-Hargrave, Deleading Dilemma: PiOfall in
Management of Childhood Lead Poisoning, 79 PEDIATRICS 214 (1987); M. Rabinowitz et
al., Home Refinishing, Lead Paint and Infant Blood Lead Levels, 75 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH
403 (1985); Ellen Ruppel Shell, An Element of Doubt, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 1995,
at 38. Shell summarizes the research of others and finds that lead removal can produce
substantial increases in lead dust levels in the house and "a subsequent spike in blood lead
levels." Id.
248. See generally R.G. Feldman, Urban Lead Mining: Lead Intoxication Among
Deleaders, 298 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1143 (1978); E.L. Baker et al., Lead Poisoning in
Children of Lead Workers, 296 NEW ENG. J. MED. 260 (1977).
249. The studies cited in the preceding footnotes generally conclude that deleading
is beneficial so long as it is done carefully and occupants vacate the house until the process
is complete. These steps may be ignored, however, absent a recognition of countervailing
risks.
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A similar risk can arise from remediation of hazardous waste sites.
The presence of hazardous substances creates an understandable concern
for those living nearby. Realistically, however, the waste site may pose
little or no risk because the hazardous substances are well-contained on
site. Forty academic scientists embarked upon a major epidemiologic
study of mortality and morbidity associated with hazardous waste sites and
found that, with one exception, the evidence of an association with disease
was "weak. I Love Canal in New York was the paramount case of un-
safe hazardous waste disposal, but studies have found that "no illness, not
even a cold, can properly be attributed to living next to Love Canal."" 1
Cleanup operations at a hazardous waste site, conversely, may create
considerable risk. One source of risk is to the cleanup workers because
"the accidental fatality risk from cleanup [for a typical site] appears to be
several times larger than the health risk from not cleaning up. "2 These
risks are often ignored, even though "cleanup at a single site . . . may
involve thousands of man-hours of work with heavy earth-moving equip-
ment, as well as worker exposure to the risks of toxic chemicals and auto-
mobile commuting."" One study calculated that the Superfund cleanups
taken by 1994 had caused an estimated 720 deaths associated with removal
and remediation.5 4 Other regulations also typically require construction
or other manufacturing that will cause an increase in worker deaths. 5
Given the relatively low risks associated with the undisturbed sites, it
seems likely that cleanups in a number of cases have caused more mortal-
250. ExEcuTivE SCIENTIFIC PANEL OF UNIVERSITIES ASSOCIATED FOR RESEARCH AND
EDUCATION IN PATHOLOGY, HEALTH ASPECTS OF THE DISPOSAL OF WASTE CHEMICALS 344
(Joe Grisham ed., 1986). The Executive Scientific Panel of Universities Associated for
Research and Education in Pathology concluded that "none of the investigations has provided
sufficient evidence to support the hypothesis that a causal link exists between exposure to
chemicals at a disposal site and latent or delayed adverse health effects in the general popu-
lace." Id. at 246. An independent investigation of the studies likewise found that the only
studies showing positive effects were "weak or inconclusive." Gary M. Marsh & Richard
J. Caplan, Evaluating Health Effects of Exposure at Hazardous Waste Sites: A Review of the
State-of-the-Art, with Recommendations for Future Research, in HEALTH EFFECTS FROM
HAZARDOUS WASTES 3, 65 (Julian B. Andelman & Dwight W. Underhill eds., 1987).
251. WILDAVSKY, supra note 26, at 152.
252. GRAHAM & WIENER, supra note 49, at 16.
253. W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser, The Fatality and Injury Costs of Expen-
ditures, 8 J. RISK UNCERTAINTY 19, 19 (1994).
254. W. Kip Viscusi, Risk-Risk Analysis, 8 J. RISK UNCERTAINTY 1, 3 (1994).
255. See Viscusi & Zeckhauser, supra note 253, at 33 (calculating relative risk in
different industries, based on dollar expenditures). For example, for each $689 million in
construction expenditures induced by a regulation, one worker is likely to die. Id.
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ity than they have averted, yet the risks of remediation are commonly
ignored in the pursuit of precaution. 6 Furthermore, the more exhaustive
the cleanup effort, perhaps out of concern for dirt-eating children or
farmers, the greater the risk of fatalities to workers."57
The transportation of hazardous waste in cleanup operations also
creates health risks. When hazardous substances are removed from a site,
they are typically transported to a modern, state-of-the-art disposal facility.
This requires some form of shipping the wastes, with the attendant possi-
bility of accidental release. One study found that the transportation of
waste alone may create a health risk fourteen times greater than the health
benefits of remediation.58 Another study found that the series of ship-
ments necessary to move the waste from a particular disposal site probably
would yield from one to three transportation spills of the waste, with
uncertain but possibly significant health consequences. 59
The cleanup of a hazardous waste site near Cincinnati, known as the
Fernald site and regarded as particularly hazardous, yielded an instructive
study of remediation risks. In cleanup considerations at many sites, the
risks to cleanup workers are not even considered, 2 ° but the Fernald
committee considered a range of remediation risks. The committee found
a considerable (four in one thousand) cancer risk to cleanup workers and
a probable loss of several lives in connection with offsite waste transporta-
tion.26' The Fernald Citizen's Task Force ultimately rejected the most
256. Id. at 19 (noting that "[c]reated risks tend to be ignored completely when new
expenditures are principally designed for risk reduction, as with the production and installa-
tion of pollution-control equipment or the cleanup of Superfund sites").
257. See HARVARD CTR. FOR RISK ANALYSIS, RISK IN PERSPECTIVE, Sept. 1995, at 3
(summarizing presentation of Dr. Curtis Travis of Oak Ridge National Laboratory whose
"key finding is that worker fatality risks tend to increase as the desired levels of cleanup
increase, since more soil excavation, solidification, and transportation is required to make
the site cleaner").
258. Thomas Mar et al., Physical Injury Risk Versus Risk from Hazardous Waste
Remediation: A Case History, 17 REG. Tox. & PHARMACOL. 130, 134 (1993).
259. Susan Brett et al., Assessment of the Public Health Risks Associated with the
Proposed Excavation of a Hazardous Waste Site, in THE RISK ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMEN-
TAL AND HuMAN HEALTH HAZARDS, supra note 75, at 427, 446.
260. See HARVARD CTR. FOR RISK ANALYSIS, supra note 257, at 3 (summarizing
presentation of Alan Krupnick of Resources for the Future who observed that in "the official
'Records of Decisions' at many sites, the possibility of dangers to remediation workers are
not even mentioned").
261. Fernald Citizens Task Force, Recommendations on Remediation Levels, Waste
Disposition, Priorities, and Future Use, app. E, at 17-18 (June 1995). The Committee also
found that "serious ecological damage ... would occur from widespread excavation." 1d.
at 33. The process could rob square miles of "vital top soil, mature trees, and vegetation."
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precautionary cleanup alternative, because it "would not only be expen-
sive, but would also necessitate disposal of the soil elsewhere and would
entail construction risks to the remediation workers."262 The most protec-
tive approach also "posed the risk of disturbing contamination that was
otherwise fairly immobile. "' While the avoidance of mechanistic precau-
tion was wise, even the more moderate alternative selected may have
caused more deaths.
Those living near the site may also suffer increased risk from cleanup
operations. Thoroughly cleaning up a waste disposal site involves digging
and consequent disruption of hazardous substances, a disruption that may
introduce new sources of human exposure to the substances. There is an
"increased potential for chemical exposure of surrounding populations that
is inherent with remedial activities."2" One evaluation of a specific haz-
ardous waste site cleanup found that individuals living nearby would be
exposed to a higher level of airborne chemicals from the cleanup than the
exposure that existed prior to cleanup.26 A federal court took cognizance
that the installation of certain wells in the course of a Superfund site
cleanup could perversely cause hazardous substance contamination to
spread to an underground aquifer, thereby increasing the environmental
risk. 266 The transfer of pesticides to a landfill in Tennessee polluted
groundwater with carcinogenic organic solvents, implicated as a source of
various health problems.267 Incineration is generally a safe procedure for
hazardous waste disposal, but certain standards for sewage sludge disposal
were estimated to save 0.2 cases of cancer by prohibiting land disposal
while creating 2 additional cancers by shifting to incineration.268 Such
action requires the expenditure of money in order to increase public health
risk - the worst of all possible worlds. Further trade-offs may occur in
a conflict between protection of human health and the natural ecology.269
Id. at 34.
262. Applegate, supra note 38, at 1653-54.
263. Id.
264. Thomas C. Marshall et al., A Risk Assessment of a Former Pesticide Production
Facility, in THE RISK ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND HUMAN HEALTH HAZARDS,
supra note 75, at 461, 502.
265. Brett et al., supra note 259, at 427.
266. United States v. Princeton Gamma-Tech, Inc., 31 F.3d 138, 141 (3d Cir. 1994).
267. THE CONSERVATION FOUND., STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT: AN ASSESSMENT AT
MID-DECADE 329 (1984).
268. U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 25 (1991).
269. See Glenn W. Suter, II et al., An Approach for Balancing Health and Ecological
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Additional risks of remediation may arise in air pollution control.
When a proposed regulation required expensive and energy-intensive
equipment to control emissions from coal-fired power plants, researchers
discovered that "the equipment would have reduced power plant efficiency
by about one percent, so an additional four large power plants nationally
would have been needed."'T From this, a "simple analysis indicated that
more workers would die in such a large-scale construction program and
many more public fatalities would be associated with operating the four
added power plants" than the one life projected to be saved by the rule.27
Some environmentalists proclaim the economic benefits of public health
regulation because of new markets for pollution-control products, but the
downside of this is the added manufacturing risk: "To the extent that gov-
ernment regulations mandate other economic efforts, such as the installa-
tion of pollution-control equipment, there will be some injuries and deaths
associated with manufacturing of this, equipment. "272 This health cost does
not dejustify all efforts to control pollution (except perhaps under the pre-
cautionary principle itself), but the potential mortality risks demonstrate
that blind precaution can be counterproductive.
The shifting of risk media characterized by hazardous substance
cleanup is pervasive in environmental regulation.273 In many cases, meas-
ures to preclude air pollution only shifted the problem to the water, and
vice versa. The Clean Air Act "requirement that all coal-burning power
plants install scrubbers to remove sulfur dioxide from their smokestacks
has generated tons of sulfur sludge that must be disposed of elsewhere. "274
Risks at Hazardous Waste Sites, 15 RisK ANALYsIs 221, 222 (1995) (observing that remedia-
don to protect ecological values may cause "accidental injuries and deaths among workers"
and "increased exposure on and off the site to contaminants in dust, vapors, emissions from
treatment facilities, etc."). Conversely, cleanups to protect human health can cause habitat
destruction and additional contaminant exposure. Id. Efforts to reduce one ecological risk
to animals may likewise require harms to plants and other animal species. Id.
270. Keeney, supra note 56, at 629.
271. Id.
272. W. Kip Viscusi, Risk-Risk Analysis, 17 J. RISK UNCERTAINTY 5, 6 (1994).
273. See Lakshman Guruswarny, The Case of Integrated Pollution Control, 54 LAW &
CoNTEM. PRoBs. 41, 42 (Autumn 1991) ("Limitations on discharges in one medium, such
as air, while correcting the immediate pollution problem within that medium, often do little
more than shift the pollution to another medium. Such transfers can create even greater
problems in the medium to which they are moved."); Richard J. Lazarus, The Meaning and
Promotion of Environmental Justice, 5 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 1, 3 (1995)
(declaring that "the laws generally convert environmental risks of one kind or at one location
to residual risks of another kind or at another location").
274. GRAHAM & WIENER, supra note 49, at 13. The authors further observe that the
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Resultant water quality regulations "have for years removed toxic pollut-
ants from water and disposed of them in landfills, some of which promptly
leached into groundwater."275 The EPA conceded that its water quality
effluent guidelines for the chemical industry "fail to treat substantial por-
tions of volatile and semi-volatile pollutants but rather transfer them to the
air. " 6 One commentator suggests that the "present regime concentrates
on moving pollution from one place to another. . . [so] pollutants ulti-
mately re-enter the flow of material in the environment."277 The common
answer to this problem is pollution prevention, but even these programs
aimed at reducing the use of toxic chemicals may produce "production
processes that reduce one kind of pollution by increasing another. "27 8 The
commonality of such intermedia shifts does not condemn all pollution-
control programs. Some media present less risk of human exposure than
do others. Exposure may be relatively more safe from some media -
a substance that causes lung cancer from inhalation in the air may not be
so hazardous when ingested in water. The critical point is that a media
shift may increase or decrease risk, so that this consequence must be con-
sidered lest blind application of the precautionary principle produce greater
risk.
Another instance of counterproductive control measures can be found
in regulation of nuclear power. The most serious nuclear accident that has
occurred, at Chernobyl, resulted from "an effort to increase reactor safety
by providing yet another source of emergency power. "279 After the far
less serious accident at Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania, "nuclear plants
worldwide were shut down and restarted more frequently for safety
checks, although these phases of operations (as with aircraft takeoffs and
landings) are by far the riskiest operational stages. "280 Certain screening
scrubber requirement has "ironically also increased emissions of other pollutants such as the
greenhouse gas carbon dioxide." Id.
275. CROSS, supra note 47, at 149.
276. Id. (quoting EPA water quality effluent guidelines for chemicals industry).
277. Guruswamy, supra note 273, at 41.
278. Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice": The Distributional Effects
of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 787, 794 (1993); see also HARVARD CTR.
FOR RISK ANALYSIS, supra note 257, at 4 (summarizing presentation of Dr. Lester Lave of
Carnegie Mellon who explained how efforts to reduce small amount of toxic emissions
attributable to automobile manufacturers could perversely increase emissions from suppliers
of automotive inputs).
279. WILDAVSKY, supra note 122, at 130.
280. Roger Kasperson et al., The Social Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual Frame-
work, 8 RISK ANALYsIS 177, 184 (1988).
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requirements for nuclear power plant personnel "can pose a threat to
reactor safety when [they] delay the entry of needed expert personnel
during an accident such as the one at Three Mile Island. ,28 1 Some re-
quirements aimed at reducing the risk of radiation release to the outside
population cause workers to be needlessly exposed to radiation in retrofit-
ting operations." Nuclear safety regulation is obviously necessary, but
blind application of the precautionary principle across the board will
increase the overall risk level by creating new sources of hazard.
The adverse effects of remediation can also be seen in areas other
than public health regulation. The unfortunate oil spill in Prince William
Sound, Alaska provoked extensive efforts to clean up the oil from the
beaches and water. This straightforward effort at environmental protec-
tion may well have damaged the overall ecosystem. Efforts to clean oil
from the beaches as rapidly as possible caused the use of high-pressure hot
water jets that may have "cooked" more organisms to death than were
harmed by the oil itself. 83 Other measures may also have been counter-
productive; the mere human presence at the cleanup site caused harm from
simple "trampling."284 The cleanup efforts did not merely cause harm,
they apparently caused more harm than benefit and more harm than the oil
spill caused in the first place.' The counterproductive cleanup was not
281. WILDAvSKY, supra note 122, at 127.
282. Id. at 124.
283. See Washing Alaska's Oiled Beaches Backfired, Caused More Damage than Good,
Scientists Say, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2228 (Apr. 12, 1991) [hereinafter Washing Alaska's
Oiled Beaches Backfired].
284. See Frank B. Cross, Restoring Restoration for Natural Resource Damages, 24 U.
TOL. L. REv. 319, 336 (1993); see also EASTERBROOK, supra note 4, at 56 (reporting
concerns of researcher Dennis Lees). Easterbrook notes that:
Lees's concern was that the cleanup did more damage than the spill. Under
pressure from public opinion, Exxon and the Coast Guard committed themselves
to a grand-scale cleanup operation that at its peak placed in the sound the greatest
concentration of vessels engaged in a single operation since the Normandy
landing. Hundreds of ships of all sizes anchored in the fjord, motors spewing
exhaust and lubricants. Heavy helicopters thundered overhead; floatplanes and
seaplanes darted everywhere. Navy landing craft were run ashore on beaches to
act as dormitories for cleanup crews, crushing intertidal ecosystems beneath their
bulks. In many ways, these mechanized intrusions were of greater magnitude to
the sound than one spill from a single vessel, even a spill of great proportions.
Id.
285. The chief scientist of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
declared that the "abundance and diversity of life is significantly lower" at cleaned up sites
"than on places left alone with oil." Washing Alaska's Oiled Beaches Backfired, supra note
283, at 2228. Others reported that the "[tireated beaches are clearly in the worse shape."
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unique to the Exxon Valdez spill. Similar problems occurred with the
Torrey Canyon oil spill and efforts to restore Mount St. Helens after its
eruption.' The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected a restora-
tion program following a Caribbean oil spill, reporting that the restoration
itself could be "unjustifiably dangerous to the healthy mangroves and
marine animals still present in the area. "287
In another type of paradoxical peril, safety measures may not increase
the particular risk being addressed, but can create different, collateral risks
that may exceed the intended benefit of the rule. The best known case of
this risk involves automobile fuel efficiency regulations. In response to
the OPEC threat, Congress created Corporate Average Fuel Economy
(CAFE) standards in order to save fuel and reduce pollution. To meet
the CAFE standards, automobile manufacturers had to produce smaller,
lighter cars that get better gas mileage. Tragically, these smaller cars are
less safe when involved in highway accidents. Robert Crandall and John
Graham found that each five hundred pound reduction in the weight of
cars was associated with at least a fourteen percent increase in the risk of
serious injury and death.' The National Highway Traffic Safety Admin-
Richard A. Kerr, A Lesson Learned, Again, at Valdez, 252 SCIENCE 371, 371 (Apr. 19,
1991). A study by the Moss Landing Institute found that the shoreline cleanup would
"increase immediate ecological damage and delay recovery" of the ecosystem. JOHN
KEEBLE, OUT OF THE CHANNEL: THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL IN PRINCE WILLIAM SOUND
266 (1991). The cleanup process in the sound itself may have left the area "with its
ecological balance so traumatized, so it may never recover." Hearings on Oil Spill Response
Technology Before the Subcomm. on Oceanography, Great Lakes and the Outer Continental
Shelf of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 102d Cong. 118 (1991)
(statement of Rep. Hertel).
286. With respect to the harm of cleanup at Torrey Canyon, see Kerr, supra note 285,
at 371. With respect to Mount St. Helens, see Jerry F. Franklin et al., Re-Creation of
Ecosystems at Mount St. Helens: Contrasts in Artificial and Natural Approaches, in 2
REHABILITATING DAMAGED ECOSYSTEMS 17 (John Cairns ed., 1988).
287. Puerto Rico v. S.S. Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 676 (1st Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981).
288. Robert C. Crandall & John D. Graham, Automobile Safety Regulation and Off-
setting Driver Behavior: Some New Empirical Estimates, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 328, 328-30
(1984). Crandall and Graham estimated that CAFE could cost thousands of lives and tens
of thousands of serious injuries. Id.; see also Leonard Evans & Michael C. Frick, Car Size
or Car Mass: Which Has Greater Influence on Fatality Risk?, 82 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1105,
1105 (1992) (concluding that reduced car mass is associated with increased safety risk to
occupants); John D. Graham, The Safety Risks of Proposed Fuel Economy Legislation, 3
RISK 95, 126 (1992). Upon judicial review, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
stressed that the likely consequence of the CAFE standard appeared to be an increase in
traffic fatalities. See Competitive Enter. Inst. v. NHTSA, 956 F.2d 321, 326-27 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (reviewing evidence and finding that nothing in record "appears to undermine the
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istration (NHTSA) has wavered in its policy on CAFE standards under
political pressure, but did take a stand against increasing the fuel effi-
ciency standards further.28 9 The "U.S. Department of Transportation esti-
mates that 1,300 lives are lost per year because of the switch from larger
cars to the smaller, more fuel-efficient vehicles. "2  Ironically, while the
CAFE standards made cars more fuel efficient, they may not have de-
creased total automobile fuel consumption, meaning that the standards
traded safety for nothing.2 91 Other studies suggest that some automobile
recalls may also cause greater risk than they prevent.2
The debate over mandating child safety seats on airlines reflects
another aspect of this risk. While child safety seats themselves increase
safety, requiring the use of such seats would require the parents of young
children to purchase a second ticket to travel by air, which in turn would
make air travel unaffordable for many and induce them to drive to their
destinations. This effect would mean more infant deaths because driving
risks are much higher than those from air travel, even without the safety
seats.293
Somewhat more indirect risks from regulation arise from the offset-
ting behavior of consumers affected by the rule. Imposing safety precau-
tions can have a lulling effect on consumers, causing them to take more
voluntary risks and counteract the benefit of the safety measures. The
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) rule requiring safety caps
on some drug bottles apparently had just this effect. One study found that
parents took fewer precautions in reliance on the reputedly childproof
caps, so that poisonings actually increased. The regulatory action may
have produced 3500 additional analgesic poisonings per year.294 Other
inference that the 27.5 mpg standard kills people").
289. See Kazman, Death by Regulation, supra note 30, at 21 (observing that NHTSA
analyses suggest that hazardous effects of automobile downsizing have more than counter-
acted beneficial consequences of mandated airbags).
290. Viscusi, supra note 30, at 3.
291. See Peter Passell, Were the Goveniment's Mileage Standards for Cars a Mistake?,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1995, at D2 (noting that "growth in the number of vehicle-miles
traveled has more than offset the improved efficiency of the auto fleet"). More efficient
cars are cheaper to drive, thus encouraging more driving. This may not entirely offset the
energy savings from efficiency, but it probably creates an even greater safety risk - more
driving presumably means more accidents.
292. See Keeney, supra note 56, at 629 (citing study by Lester Lave which found that
recall of cars for inspection and replacement of potentially defective axle part would cause
more risk from extra driving than risk associated with recall).
293. See Kazman, Death by Regulation, supra note 30, at 19.
294. Viscusi, supra note 30, at 240.
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research demonstrated similar increases in risk in response to CPSC
standards on bicycles, cribs, carpets, and matches.29 The lulling effect
is not reason in itself to eschew regulation, but the effect illustrates the
potential counterproductivity of government action. This risk is especially
pronounced when government overclaims the benefits from a regulation,
thereby producing a false sense of security in the affected public.
IL Additional Indirect Risks of the Precautionary Principle
The direct physical risks of safety described in Section I above
present the most compelling cause against the precautionary principle
because the risk transfer is so blatant and direct. With a few exceptions
(e.g., international use of DDT, coal-fired power generation), the magni-
tude of perverse risk creation from this physical transfer is fortunately
rather small.' 9 Cass Sunstein has noted that the existence of counterpro-
ductive control measures may not be "so troubling," because "most of the
time the risks we face are, or seem, blessedly low." 2  Many of the
examples described in Section I involved the government regulating a
miniscule risk and creating a greater, but still exceedingly small, new risk.
These judgments are not wise but neither are they typically catastrophic.
Greater health risks are caused indirectly by the deployment of the
precautionary principle. This section discusses two important indirect
mechanisms of counterproductivity in public health regulation. First,
there are substantial health "risks from the misallocation of government
resources to attack the wrong problems. Precautionary pursuit of tiny risk
is harmful to the extent that greater risks are overlooked. Second, there
are health risks from the societal economic costs of regulation. These
consequences are now examined.
A. Health Risks of Political Resource Misallocation
In practice, the precautionary principle suffers from tunnel vision.
Advocates focus on an apparent public health problem, demand that it be
295. Id. at 243.
296. This issue is addressed in a recent NAS Report. The report found that natural
chemicals presented a greater dietary risk than synthetic chemicals, but all were present at
such low levels that they were "unlikely to pose an appreciable cancer risk." Jane E.
Brody, Food Chemical-Cancer Link? Expert Panel Is Not Worried, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16,
1996, at Al. A significant risk might be created, however, if fears caused less consumption
of anticarcinogenic produce. Id. at A10.
297. Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword to JOHN D. GRAHAM & JONATHAN B. WIENER, RISK
VERSUS RISK: TRADE-OFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT at vii (1995).
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addressed out of precaution, and further demand that regulation be particu-
larly strict to avoid any risk of adverse effects. The debate unfortunately
dwells on the merits of the particular problem under consideration, with-
out any attention to opportunity costs. In reality, there are a myriad of
potential public health and environmental issues to address and a limit to
the time, effort, and money available. Consequently, the precautionary
principle is not precautionary in overall effect. Focusing great precaution
upon the instant problem must reduce precaution upon other problems,
which may prove greater and more serious.298 In this sense, the precau-
tionary principle gives fealty not to precaution, but to whatever issue
happens to alight atop the agenda for attention.299
A current movement both within and without the government is
known as comparative risk."°° This approach contends that the govern-
ment should compare the magnitude of various environmental risks to
public health and should focus its regulatory attention upon the greatest of
these risks. The agencies have a limited budget and number of employ-
ees, although drafting a regulation may take considerable time and investi-
gation.30 1 Moreover, society has limited financial resources and limited
298. See Applegate, supra note 38, at 1657 (suggesting that "agency that lacks a delib-
erate planning and priority-setting process will simply respond to the crisis du jour and will
drift, squander its resources, and ultimately accomplish little").
299. See, e.g., John Graham, Making Sense of Risk: An Agenda for Congress 2
(unpublished paper, presented at American Enterprise Institute Conference on Risk Assess-
ment and Public Policy (Oct. 27, 1994)) (observing that "[l]arge amounts of resources are
devoted to slight or speculative dangers while substantial and well-documented dangers
remain unaddressed").
300. See, e.g., U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, UNFINISHED BUSINESS:
A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS (1987) (attempting to develop
EPA comparative risk assessment program). The debate over comparative risk is thoroughly
addressed in WORST THINGS FIRST?, supra note 123. The current use of comparative risk
in government agencies is presented most directly in F. Henry Habicht, II, EPA's Vision for
Setting National Environmental Priorities, in WORST THINGS FIRST?, supra note 123, at 33,
33-46, and Charles W. Kent & Frederick W. Allen, An Overview of Risk-Based-Priority
Setting at EPA, in WORST THiNGS FiRs., supra note 123, at 47, 47-68. See generally John
S. Applegate, Worst Things First: Risk, Information and Regulatory Structure in Toxic Sub-
stances Control, 9 YALE J. REG. 277 (1992); Frank B. Cross, Why Shouldn't We Regulate
the Worst Things First?, 4 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 312 (1995).
301. See, e.g., Richard Andrews, Long-Range Planning in Environmental Health and
Regulatory Agencies, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 515, 516 (1993) (remarking that "agency regulatory
processes have become labyrinthine and cumbersome" due to "inadequate resources,
increasingly heavy burdens of proof to justify agency proposals, constant and detailed
oversight," and other factors); Applegate, supra note 300, at 286 (observing that "informa-
tion and analysis costs associated with developing a major regulation are high in any event,
but extensive industry involvement requires extensive analysis during the rulemaking process
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"worry beads" with which it may concentrate its concern. Historically,
even with precautionary concern, a federal agency has been unable to
issue more than two or three major public health regulations of chemicals
in a year. 10 Given such limits, precautionary attention to one problem
inevitably draws responsive efforts from other problems. 3"
Insofar as the precautionary principle diverts action from problem A
to problem B, the principle is counterproductive whenever the risk from
A is greater in magnitude than that from B. Yet, by its very terms, the
precautionary principle ignores this loss in its single-minded focus on
eliminating any risk of a risk from the problem under attention.3° Even
the Supreme Court noted that if government agencies must respond to
public fears of risk, the "available resources may be spread so thin that
agencies are unable adequately to pursue protection of the physical envi-
ronment and natural resources. ,305 Stephen Breyer was not on the Court
at the time of that decision, but he has written that dollars spent unneces-
sarily on precaution mean that the "money is not, or will not be, there to
spend, at least if we want to address more serious environmental or social
problems - the need for better prenatal care, vaccinations, and cancer
diagnosis, not to mention daycare, housing and education. "306
to respond to arguments and prepare for the inevitable court challenge").
302. Applegate, supra note 300, at 287. The Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
tration has a budget that will permit no more than two major rules per year. CROSS, supra
note 47, at 140.
303. See Milton Russell, The Making of Cruel Choices, in VALUING HEALTH RISKS,
COSTS, AND BENEFITS FOR ENvIRONMENTAL DECISION MAKING, supra note 30, at 15, 18
(stressing that "the selection of any action simultaneously rejects others").
• 304. See Dennis J. Paustenbach, A Survey of Health Risk Assessment, in THE RISK
ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND HUMAN HEALTH HAZARDS, supra note 75, at 27, 101
("Money or regulatory attention spent on one risk is not available for another, so it is
important not to waste resources on trivial risks. Here, conservatism is counterproductive,
and risks are increased if resources are shifted from significant risks to small, exaggerated
risks.").
305. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 776
(1983).
306. BREYER, supra note 30, at 19. For a real world example of this effect, see
Graham, supra note 299, at 8 (observing that in Columbus, Ohio, "environmental mandates
from U.S. EPA are forcing cuts in basic public health services typically provided by the
state's health department"). While perfect fungibility is illusory, the author stresses that
"resources for protection against dangers are being rationed" today. Id. There is a trade-off
between resources for regulation of a given pollutant and other public health protection
resources. One case study found that environmental activists siphoned off government
resources intended for low-income assistance in order to fuel environmental litigation that
was contrary to the interests of the poor. See H. Peter Metzger & Richard A. Westfall, The
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The trade-off between these objectives is concededly imperfect.
Government resources are not perfectly fungible nor are they always
efficiently allocated.3" Less money for toxic chemical regulation does not
necessarily translate into more money for childhood vaccinations. 0 8 Yet,
the imperfection of the trade-off does not deny its existence, and the trade-
offs are most likely to occur within agencies, which have some flexibility
in whether to allocate their attention to, say, the ambient ozone standard
or the ambient standard for airborne particulates. 0 9 When the federal
courts required the EPA to expedite its regulation of radionuclides in the
air, "the agency had to take personnel from development of new source
performance standards, which probably would have provided more overall
health protection."3"0 Likewise, the FDA's felt need to focus on minimal
risks from pesticides in foods has diverted its attention from the much
greater hazards of microbial contamination.3 ' The health risks from mis-
prioritization caused by the precautionary principle may be substantial.
Research at the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis finds that improved
Great Ecology Swindle, POL'Y REv., Winter 1981, at 71.
307. See David A. Wirth & Ellen K. Silbergeld, Risky Reform, 95 COLUM. L. REv.
1857, 1884 (1995) (criticizing Breyer because "he assumes without proof that those re-
sources could be more effectively allocated elsewhere").
308. See E. Donald Elliot, Jr., A Cabin on the Mountain: Reflections on the Distribu-
tional Consequences of Environmental Protection Programs, 1 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 5,
8 (1991) (declaring that he had to "be a little skeptical about whether the money we spend
on cleaning up toxic waste sites really would go to dealing with infant mortality instead").
309. See Warren & Marchant, supra note 59, at 388 n.42 (declaring that "enormous
resources are being committed to reduce air pollutants such as ozone and sulfur dioxide,
which affect health and the environment but have not been shown to cause death, while
relatively little has been spent to reduce small soot particles, which EPA estimates may be
causing as many as 60,000 premature deaths in the United States per year").
310. CROSS, supra note 47, at 153.
311. See Roger Middlekauff, Issues of Food Safety and Quality Relating to Food
Ingredients, in CONSUMER DEMANDS IN THE MARKETPLACE- 45, 48 (Katherine L. Clancy
ed., 1988) (observing that preoccupation with cancer risks from food additives "has dis-
tracted the public from other food and food-ingredient concerns that may have an even
greater impact on their health"); Passell, supra note 63, at D12 (suggesting that focus on
pesticides has diverted FDA attention from contaminated meat, eggs, and other foods); see
also Perry J. Gehring, Risk Management in the Absence of Credible Risk Assessment, in
PESTICIDE RESIDUES AND FOOD SAFETY, supra note 102, at 267, 274 ("Because of the
anxieties generated in those areas where we cannot provide exact quantification, we find
ourselves diverting resources away from more significant risks. For example, while the risk
estimated from exposure to pesticide residues in food averages on the order of one cancer
in a million, the risk of illness from microbial contamination is one in a hundred, with the
risk of death estimated at about one in a thousand.").
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prioritization could save an additional 60,000 lives each year.3"2 This
figure assumes a redistributive efficiency beyond realistic achievement.
Yet, the study demonstrates that even a marginal ten percent redirection
of resources could save thousands of lives. Unfortunately, the precaution-
ary principle takes no account of these indirect effects of regulation and
thereby ignores the readily available benefit from a prioritization based
upon the best scientific evidence.
The precautionary principle creates a second form of political re-
search misallocation because its quixotic quest, for the best defeats our
ability to achieve the good. By its nature, the precautionary principle
aims for virtually absolutist goals, eliminating any hint of risk from a sub-
stance subject to government regulation. This approach fails to account
for the inevitable trade-off between the "depth" and the "breadth" of gov-
ernment action. Regulating any one substance more strictly or deeply re-
quires additional resources that will unintentionally preclude more wide-
spread regulation of a greater number of risks.
John Mendeloff's study of the Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration (OSHA) demonstrated the dichotomy between the depth and
breadth of regulatory action. 31 3 He referred to the trade-off as one of
overregulation and underregulation. The overregulation of any one
substance as compelled by the precautionary principle would lead to the
underregulation of other substances never attended by the agency. Men-
deloff noted that OSHA began by adopting the four hundred occupational
health standards already set by a private group, the American Conference
of Government Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH). OSHA thereby was able
to hit the ground running with standards in place, and the agency was to
revisit and modify the ACGIH standards as appropriate and set additional
standards for theretofore unregulated substances. From its 1970 inception
until 1986, OSHA reconsidered and lowered the ACGIH standards for
only ten chemicals; during the same time period, ACGIH had lowered its
standards for nearly one hundred chemicals and adopted recommended
exposure limits for an additional two hundred chemicals.31 4 Mendeloff
found that ACGIH could regulate many more chemicals because its
response to any given chemical was less strict - the ACGIH exposure
reductions were about fifty percent, while OSHA's typical reduction was
312. See generally Tammy 0. Tengs et al., Five Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and
Their Cost-Effectiveness, 15 RISK ANALYSIS 369 (1994).
313. JOHN MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA OF Toxic SUBSTANCE REGULATION: How
OVERREGULATION CAUSES UNDERREGULATION AT OSHA (1988).
314. Id. at 82.
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around ninety percent." 5 While the ACGIH reductions for any one
chemical under consideration were less, ACGIH addressed so many more
substances that its reductions promised to save several hundred more lives
than did the OSHA actions.31 6
Mendeloff's dilemma is further demonstrated by the historic pattern
of EPA regulation of hazardous air pollutants. The language of the Clean
Air Act suggested that hazardous air pollutants had to be regulated so
stringently as to eliminate any risk of health harm, however remote - a
virtual physical impossibility. 3 7 As a consequence, the EPA regulated
very few substances as hazardous air pollutants (less than one each year),
acknowledging that the Act's strict decision rule had "deterred the listing
and promulgation of many regulations. ,318  Congress finally confronted
this reality in the 1990 amendments to the Act, which "clearly recognized
the value of trading stringency for speed and scope. ' 319  Comparable
examples can be found in other areas of government public health regula-
tion. 320  Thus, "the price of excessively stringent statutory criteria is a
sluggish or paralyzed standard-setting process. "321
Stephen Breyer has characterized this problem as the counterproduc-
tive effort to eliminate the "last ten percent" of risk from a substance or
activity. He declares that strategy unwise because it involves "high cost,
devotion of considerable agency resources, large legal fees, and endless
315. See John Mendeloff, Regulatory Reform and OSHA Policy, 5 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS
& MGMT. 440, 442 (1986).
316. Id.
317. See Frank B. Cross, Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act: A New Approach to the
Control of Airborne Carcinogens, 13 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 215, 226-27 (1986).
318. Id. at 227. This story is also told in John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic
Legislation, 17 EcOLOGY L.Q. 233 (1990). Dwyer observes that the stringent precautionary
margin of safety standard in the law made it difficult for standards to survive judicial review
and served to polarize the interested parties, thereby preventing an effective compromise
solution. Id. at 279-81.
319. Applegate, supra note 300, at 327.
320. Mendeloff cites § 4 of the Toxic Substances Control Act as a provision that con-
tains such stringent requirements as to limit the EPA to two to three promulgated rules each
year. John Mendeloff, Does Overregulation Cause Underregulation? The Case of Toxic
Substances, REGULATION, Sept./Oct. 1981, at 50. The stringency of the Delaney Clause
has meant that it is seldom effectively used for cancer prevention. See CROSS, supra note
47, at 144 (suggesting that clause "had made no meaningful contribution to cancer protec-
tion"). As the NHTSA promulgated stricter auto safety standards, its pace slowed, and
NHTSA virtually abandoned its standard-setting efforts. JERRY L. MAsHAW & DAVID L.
HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 10-11 (1990).
321. John P. Dwyer, Overregulation, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 719, 737 (1988).
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argument" with only limited payoff.3" Such stringent rules are also more
likely to be challenged in court and overturned on judicial review." Even
when such rules are adopted successfully, the effort to eliminate the last
ten percent wastes considerable resources. Breyer quotes an EPA admin-
istrator as observing that "about 95 percent of the toxic material could be
removed from [Superfund] waste sites in a few months, but years are
spent trying to remove the last little bit. "324 Draconian standards under
Superfund have undermined effective cleanup and health protection mea-
sures.3" The precautionary principle's insistent demand for ever higher
safety margins in each regulation perversely serves to reduce the overall
amount of effective public health regulation.326
A regulatory program that focused upon the greatest risks to public
health and the environment would produce greater benefit, yet the precau-
tionary principle eschews such risk comparisons. In addition to addressing
the greatest risks, the government should also consider the remediability
of environmental problems.327 It makes little sense to dwell extensively
upon even a great problem that cannot feasibly be solved. The precaution-
ary principle does not take remediability into account, however. The prin-
ciple presses for zero risk, regardless of formal realizability. Thus, the
precautionary principle obstructs consideration of two key factors -
priorities and capabilities - in maximizing the protection of public health
and the environment.
322. BREYER, supra note 30, at 11; see also Warren & Marchant, supra note 59, at 388
(reporting that attempt to "defend overly stringent regulations that provide limited extra
benefits at high marginal costs" requires agencies to "expend both resources and precious
political capital" that could be better devoted to other problems).
323. BREYER, supra note 30, at 10; see also FREDERICK ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRON-
MENTAL IMPROVEMENT THROUGH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES 15 (1977) (observing that when
government requirements are extremely costly or unproved, "a firm can reasonably expect
to make a convincing case in court about the infeasibility or unreasonableness of the emis-
sion requirements").
324. BREYER, supra note 30, at 11 (quoting Superfund project manager Leo Levenson).
325. See generally Frank B. Cross & Scott Segal, And the Meek Shall Inherit a Cleaner
Earth, 9 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. LAW 269 (1993-94) (demonstrating how strict
liability standards and insistence upon "utter purity" cleanup standards have frustrated
implementation of law).
326. See, e.g., Douglas N. Jones & Richard A. Tybout, Environmental Regulation and
Electric Utility Regulation: Compatibility and Conflict, B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 31, 35
(1986) (declaring that as "a result of our collective unwillingness to address explicitly the
economics of saving lives, we are saving far fewer lives than we could with the resources
devoted to that purpose").
327. See Applegate, supra note 38, at 1663-64 (stressing that "tractability of a problem
and the administrability of the remedy also ought to be considered").
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B. Health Risks of Economic Costs
The true health costs of unnecessary and expensive regulation are
largely overlooked in the debate over environmental and public health
protection. As previously noted, the debate tends to be drawn between
health protection for average Americans and financial costs to large cor-
porations. The real effects of regulation, however, are somewhat more
complex. Regulatory costs will be borne not by the corporation itself, but
by its customers (higher prices) or workers (fewer jobs or reduced
wages) .32
Many environmental and public health regulations are extraordinarily
costly. EPA regulations impose economic costs of tens of billions of
dollars annually, according to the agency itself.3 29 Overall social costs
will generally exceed the direct compliance costs.33° Much of the cost of
regulation will be passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices.33'
Moreover, these regulatory costs are felt most severely by the most dis-
advantaged groups - those least able to afford them. Robert Bullard has
328. See Cross, supra note 52, at 762-64 (demonstrating both theoretically and empiri-
cally that regulatory costs are primarily borne by consumers and workers); see also Alfred
F. Conard, Who Pays in the End for Injury Compensation? Reflections on Wealth Transfers
from the Innocent, 30 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 283, 288 (1993) (reporting that costs generally
will be borne by consumers but could be passed back to workers); International Union,
United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310, 1319
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (contending that costs may be passed on to consumers or passed back to
labor in form of reduced wages).
329. See Michael Hazilla & Raymond J. Kopp, Social Cost of Environmental Quality
Regulations: A General Equilibrium Analysis, 98 J. POL. EcON. 853, 857 (1990) (summariz-
ing EPA estimates of regulatory costs).
330. See id. at 865 (displaying table reporting that social costs generally exceed direct
compliance costs); see also Ann P. Bartel & Lacy G. Thomas, Predation Through Regula-
tion: The Wage and Profit Effects of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and
the Environmental Protection Agency, 30 J.L. & ECON. 239, 239-40 (1987) (noting that
indirect costs of regulation can exceed direct compliance costs); Maureen L. Cropper &
Wallace E. Oates, Environmental Economics: A Survey, 30 J. ECON. LIT. 675, 722 (1992)
(declaring that in long-run "social costs of the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts exceed
simple expenditure estimates because of the effects of decreases in income on saving and
investment").
331. See Sue Lieu, Regional Impacts of Air Quality Regulation: Applying an Economic
Model, 9 CONTEMP. POL'Y ISsUES 24, 29 (1991) (finding that southern California air quality
control plan would increase prices); Paul R. Portney, The Macroeconomic Impacts of
Federal Environmental Regulation, 21 NAT. RES. J. 459, 486 (1981) (concluding that
environmental regulation increased average inflation rate by 0.4% to 0.6%); Adam Rose,
Modeling the Macroeconomic Impact of Air Pollution Abatement, 23 J. REGIONAL Sci. 441,
456-57 (1983) (suggesting that much, but not all cost, will be passed on to consumers); see
also supra note 330 (citing sources discussing social costs of environmental regulations).
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observed that most of this nation's environmental policies "distribute the
costs in a regressive pattern while providing disproportionate benefits for
the educated and wealthy."332
While industry typically complains of the costs of compliance with
regulation, experience has shown such complaints to be occasionally over-
stated. Nevertheless, the true costs of environmental and ptiblic health
regulations are significant, and some experience reveals that the estimated
costs of regulation have been underestimated.333 Unobserved, indirect
costs may well dwarf the obvious direct compliance costs of environmental
and other public health regulation. Several large studies have examined
the consequences of health and safety regulation on business productivity
and concluded that over thirty percent of the decline in the rate of produc-
tivity growth in this country could be attributed to such rules.334 Enhanced
productivity is the key to higher wages and economic growth;335 reductions
in productivity correspondingly undermine national economic welfare. 6
The total financial costs of environmental regulation may be enormous.
332. Bullard, supra note 135, at 239.
333. See generally Miriam Heller et al., Environmental Accounting Case Study: Amoco
Yorktown Refinery, in GREEN LEDGERS: CASE STUDIES IN CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL
ACCOUNTING 47 (Daryl Ditz et al. eds., 1995). Compliance costs were initially estimated
to be around 3% of non-crude operating costs. The authors' closer investigation of indirect
effects revealed that "environmental costs were found to be approximately 22% of non-crude
operating costs," and "even this understates the total costs, in that it does not include
estimates of unknown future environmental liabilities - for example, from waste disposal."
Id. at 79.
334. See generally EDWARD F. DENISON, ACCOUNTING FOR SLOWER ECONOMIC
GROWTH 124 (1979) (concluding that 40% of decline in productivity growth in 1970s was
due to environmental and occupational safety and health regulation); Frank M. Gollop &
Mark J. Roberts, Environmental Regulations and Productivity Growth: The Case of Fossil-
Fueled Electric Power Generation, 91 J. POL. ECON. 654 (1983) (concluding that environ-
mental regulation of such utilities caused 44% reduction in utilities' productivity); Wayne
B. Gray, The Cost of Regulation: OSHA, EPA and the Productivity Slowdown, 77 AM.
ECON. REV. 998 (1987) (finding 30% of decline attributable to EPA and OSHA rules);
James C. Robinson, The Impact of Environmental and Occupational Health Regulation on
Productivity Growth in U.S. Manufacturing, 12 YALE J. REG. 387 (1995) (finding that
overall productivity was 11 % less due to environmental and occupational health rules).
335. See SARA. LEVITAN & DIANE WERNEKE, PRODUCTIVITY: PROBLEMS, PROSPECTS
AND POLICIES 3 (1984) (reporting that "declining rate of productivity growth in recent years
has been identified as a key factor behind the difficulties besetting the American economy").
336. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., PRODUCTIVITY AND AMERICAN LEADERSHIP 2
(1989) (reporting that "less than a 1 percentage point lag in productivity growth for one
century was sufficient to transform the United Kingdom from the world's undisputed
industrial leader into the third-rate economy that it is today").
PARADOXICAL PERILS
When framed in comparison with a risk to human health, even large
financial costs may seem morally insignificant. The protection of human
life is beyond material valuation. Most Americans do not behave as if
human life has infinite financial value (many accept paying jobs that
produce a health risk and demand more pay for riskier jobs). Neverthe-
less, when it comes to government policy, there may be reluctance to
sacrifice health for money. Yet this perspective makes an obvious mistake
of reducing money to the paper on which it is printed, treating currency
as if it were an end in and of itself.
Money has value only because of the things that it can buy. Some of
the things that money can buy advance public health. Correspondingly,
having less money may mean poorer health. It has become commonly
known that "richer is safer." Ample empirical evidence confirms that
greater wealth generally means better health.337 Greater wealth may pro-
mote health by enabling individuals to make protective expenditures, such
as the purchase of a child safety seat, a bicycle helmet, a smoke detector,
or a fire extinguisher for the home.338 Others believe that lower income
is a great source of psychological stress that undermines health.339 Alter-
natively, there is evidence that richer societies tend to demonstrate more
concern for health protection,314 and economic growth may encourage the
development of newer and safer products.34' As recently elaborated:
337. See generally Cross, supra note 52 (summarizing evidence that greater wealth
means better health).
338. See W. Kip Viscusi, Mortality Effects of Regulatory Costs and Policy Evaluation
Criteria, 25 RAND J. ECON. 94, 94-109 (1994). The poor have a higher rate of deaths from
fire that may be attributed to their lack of protective expenditures such as smoke detectors
or inferior home wiring. See Melvin D. Nelson, Jr., Socioeconomic Status and Childhood
Mortality in North Carolina, 82 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1131, 1132 (1992).
339. See Ralph Catalano, The Health Effects of Economic Insecurity, 81 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 1148, 1148 (1991) (finding association of economic insecurity and psychological
distress); Ralph L. Keeney & Detlof von Winterfeldt, Why Indirect Health Risks of Regula-
tions Should Be Examined, 16 INTERFACES 13, 20 (1986) (noting that stress is associated
with heart attacks); Ronald Kessler, Stress, Social Status, and Psychological Distress, 20 J.
HEALTH & Soc. BEHAV. 259, 259 (1979) (reporting association between poverty and stress);
James S. House et al., Age, Socioeconomic Status, and Health, 68 MILBANK Q. 383, 403-05
(1990) (summarizing studies on association of income with sociological difficulties).
340. See Cross, supra note 52, at 734-35 (setting forth theory that greater wealth tends
to lead to concern for health protection).
341. See PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSE-
QUENCES 160-61 (1988) (noting that new products are safer than their predecessors); see
also supra notes 124-54 and accompanying text (discussing relative safety of new products
and facilities in comparison to older products and facilities).
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A general increase in the standard of living influences societal structure.
A wealthier society leads to the development of a better and more diverse
medical research establishment, to larger markets to stimulate creation of
safer products, to an infrastructure of health clubs and many opportuni-
ties for exercise, and to the societal resilience to rapidly and efficiently
attack new unforeseen problems threatening our collective health and
safety . 342
Some combination of these dynamics yield better health as overall national
income rises. On average, higher GNP means a reduction in morbidity
and mortality. 43
The evidence for the association of wealth and health is substantial.
International comparisons reveal that wealthier nations have longer life
expectancies.' Studies within the United States likewise demonstrate that
those with higher incomes have less morbidity and mortality.345 Still other
342. Ralph L. Keeney, Mortality Risks Induced by Economic Expenditures, 10 RISK
ANALYSIS 147, 148 (1990).
343. The association of greater income and better health is strong at lower income
levels and declines markedly at high income levels. Thus, greater wealth will not enhance
the health of Bill Gates, for example. See Cross, supra note 52, at 762-63 (summarizing
curvilinear association of wealth and health). As it happens, most of the costs of environ-
mental regulations burden those at lower income levels. The consequences of regulation
typically-appear in price increases or cutbacks in employment among blue-collar workers.
Economists have shown that regulatory costs tend to be passed on in a regressive fashion.
See Hamid Beladi & John Rapp, Urban Unemployment and the Backward Incidence of
Pollution Control, 27 ANNALS REGIONAL SCI. 163, 163-72 (1993) (reporting that job
losses from environmental regulation are concentrated in blue-collar urban areas); Greg B.
Christiansen & Thomas H. Tietenberg, Distributional and Macroeconomic Aspects of
Environmental Policy, in 1 HANDBOOK OF NATURAL RESOURCE AND ENERGY EcONOMICS
345, 389 (Allen V. Kneese & James L. Sweeney eds., 1985) (summarizing evidence on
regressive distribution of costs of regulation and job losses); Leonard P. Gianessi et al., The
Distributional Impacts of Uniform Air Pollution Policy in the United States, 93 Q. J. EcON.
281, 297 (1979) (reporting that poor spend eight times higher portion of income on environ-
mental regulations). Thus, the association of compliance costs and reduced health is
applicable to environmental and public health regulations.
344. See J.R. Goldsmith, Young Adult Mortality As an Index: Associations with Income
and Social Indicators, 2 EUR. J. EPIDEM. 282, 292 (1986); Richard G. Wilkinson, National
Mortality Rates: The Impact of Inequality?, 82 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1082, 1082 (1992);
Randall Lutter & John F. Morrall, III, Health-Health Analysis: A New Way To Evaluate
Health and Safety Regulation, 8 J. RISK UNCERTAINTY 43, 53-56 (1994).
345. See generally Kenneth S. Chapman & Govind Hariharan, Controlling for Causality
in the Link from Income to Mortality, 8 J. RISK UNCERTAINTY 85 (1994); Harriet 0. Duleep,
Measuring the Effect of Income on Adult Mortality Using Longitudinal Administrative Record
Data, 20 J. HuM. RESOURCES 238 (1986); Mary Haan et al., Poverty and Health: Prospec-
tive Evidence from the Alameda County Study, 125 AM. J. EPIDEM. 989 (1987); Jack Hadley
& Anthony Osei, Does Income Affect Mortality? An Analysis of the Effects of Different Types
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research shows that death rates vary over time for a specific group of
individuals, depending on their income levels."4 Thus, an increase in
wealth of, say, $1000 would perhaps reduce one's risk of injury or disease
or premature death by one in one thousand. Scholars have used this data
to show that a societal loss in the range of $5 million to $10 million
engenders sufficient additional risk to create a statistical probability of an
additional death.347
Suppose we adopt or strengthen a regulation in reliance upon the
precautionary principle, without clear evidence of any benefit. If that
regulation imposes deadweight social costs of $5 million or more, we have
good reason to believe that an additional premature death will result from
the costs of the rule. Given the reliance on the precautionary principle,
we have little or no comparable evidence of realizable health benefits from
the rule. Hence, this application of the principle could cause more health
harm than it prevents.
The above risk is not entirely abstract; past regulations have produced
counterproductive health effects from excessive costs. For example, the
EPA's attempts to regulate airborne emissions from benzene transfer
operations produced an estimated benefit of less than one cancer case each
year, even using conservative risk assessment methods.348 This regulation
cost nearly $200 million, and similar extrapolation methods would suggest
that the rule therefore cost dozens of lives, many more than it saved.349
of Income on Age/Sex/Race-Spec fc Mortality Rates in the United States, 20 MED. CARE 901
(1982).
346. See John D. Graham et al., Poorer Is Riskier, 12 RISK ANALYSIS 333, 333-36
(1992).
347. See Cross, supra note 52, at 742 (reviewing studies that project one additional
death from income loss of $1.9 million on low end to $12.4 million on high end). The
results tend to cluster around $5 million to $6 million per life. Id. at 773.
348. EPA National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Benzene Emis-
sions from Chemical Manufacturing Process Vents, Industrial Solvent Use, Benzene Waste
Operations, Benzene Transfer Operations, and Gasoline Marketing System, 55 Fed. Reg.
8292, 8294 (1990). This estimate was based upon an "upper bound" risk estimate that
included an assumption that some individuals spent their entire 70-year lifetime outdoors at
the site of the highest benzene exposure from the transfer operation. Id. at 8305.
349. See Kenneth S. Chapman & Govind Hariharan, Controlling for Causality in the
Link from Income to Mortality, 8 J. RISK UNCERTAINTY, 85, 86 (1994) (reporting that
"OSHA's proposed air quality standards would lead to about 13 new deaths through the
indirect effect of reduced income on mortality - a number dangerously close to the 8 to 14
lives they were expected to save annually"); Cross, supra note 52, at 777-78; see also
Viscusi & Zeckhauser, supra note 253, at 39 (observing that "some government regulations
save fewer lives and injuries per $1 million than what is created by $1 million in expendi-
tures").
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The financial cost of regulation - thoroughly disdained by those pursuing
the precautionary principle - thus translates into lives lost.
Financial costs of regulation may also have a longer-term adverse
effect on environmental protection. An increasing amount of research
demonstrates that economic growth correlates with more environmental pro-
tection."' When the economy is growing, people demand greater environ-
mental protection, while times of recession cause pressure to weaken envir-
onmental regulation." 1 While no single environmental regulation is likely
to produce severe adverse economic consequences, each rule contributes to
a cumulative economic burden. To the extent that the precautionary princi-
ple counsels promulgation of costly rules with little health benefit, the long-
term consequences of the principle are environmentally perverse.
III. An Alternative to the Precautionary Principle
Because they are sound, the principles underlying the precautionary
principle should not be wholly abandoned. Scientific knowledge of public
health risks will always be tainted by some measure of uncertainty. The
existence of such uncertainty should not serve as a barrier to government
regulation - the demand for certainty is a case for imprudent paralysis of
environmental protection. But neither can the uncertainty itself be a justi-
fication for government regulation. A new methodology of administrative
analysis is required to prevent environmental and public health rules from
doing more harm than good.
Because structural incentives in the status quo unfortunately encourage
counterproductive regulatory action, some corrective methodology is re-
quired. Precautionary conservatism is built into the regulatory mindset
because failure to act can result in embarrassment before Congress and the
350. John M. Antle & Gregg Heidebrink, Environment and Development: Theory and
International Evidence, ECON. DEv. & CULTURAL CHANGE 603 (1995) (reporting study that
higher-income nations increased undeveloped parkland and afforestation); Frank B. Cross,
A Syncretic Perspective on Environmental Protection and Economic Growth, 2 KAN. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 53 (1992) (demonstrating that environment has improved with economic growth
and reporting statistical correlation between income and reduced air pollution); Gene M.
Grossman & Alan B. Krueger, Economic Growth and the Environment, Q. J. ECON. 353
(1995) (finding positive relationship between national income and measures of environmen-
tal quality in developed nations); Douglas Holtz-Eakin & Thomas M. Selden, Stoking the
Fires: C0 2 Emissions and Economic Growth, 57 J. PUB. EcON. 85 (1995) (finding that
higher-income countries emit less carbon dioxide as per capita gross domestic product
increases).
351. See Cross, supra note 350, at 54-59 (reviewing historical evidence for correlation
between economic growth and regulatory demand, and between economic recession and anti-
regulatory demand).
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public,352 while the adverse health consequences of regulation remain
largely invisible (the fact that some food additives are linked with reduced
rates of cancer, for example, is not generally known). 3  Just as private
enterprise may ignore the externalities of pollution associated with produc-
tion, government may ignore the externalities of risk created by the regula-
tions they produce. Furthermore, the compartmentalized, media-based
structure of environmental statutes and authority creates tunnel vision
among regulatorswho focus upon their territory without regard for adverse
external consequences 4.35  The precautionary principle gives administrators
ample excuse to exercise their inherent inclinations to ignore the adverse
consequences of their regulations.
The precautionary principle is all but designed to create risk as a by-
product of regulation. Of course, abandoning the precautionary principle
will not conveniently eliminate the presence of uncertainty about the magni-
tude of environmental and public health risks. This uncertainty about risk
can be considered seriously, however, without being so heavily weighted
as the precautionary principle commands. Regulators should acknowledge
uncertainty and its magnitude, which will bound any risk estimate within
a zone, rather than a precise point estimate. This will provide a moderately
accurate assessment of target risk. Even absent reliance on precaution,
regulators also must at least consider the possibility that adverse health
consequences may result from government action.
John Graham and Jonathan Wiener argue for a procedure called Risk
Trade-Off Analysis (RTA).355 RTA is to be a "more systematic, rigorous
method for recognizing and resolving risk trade-offs," but not a purely
mathematical calculation.356 While RTA is aimed at identifying and assess-
ing the coincidental adverse side effects of regulatory action, the parameters
352. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing evidence that precaution is
inherent in structure of regulatory system).
353. See GRAHAM & WIENER, supra note 49, at 230 (observing that decisionmaker acting
against target risk may gain "support or mollification of key constituencies," while "the
decisionmaker is unlikely to take account of countervailing losses imposed on constituencies
who are not participating in the dialogue"). The authors refer to this as the problem of the
"omitted voice," a problem that the authors find prevalent in regulation. Id. at 231-33.
354. See BREYER, supra note 30, at 11-19. Graham and Wiener elaborate on this point
by referencing the bounded nature of the oversight structure in government and conclude that
"mission-oriented agencies tend to overpromote their target goals and neglect side effects."
GRAHAM & WIENER, supra note 49, at 237; see also Warren & Marchant, supra note 59, at
391.
355. GRAHAM & WIENER, supra note 49, at 19-41.
356. Id. at 19. The authors observe that the analysis "will often require both objective
information and personal judgment, both expert analysis and ethical values." Id.
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of the proposed analysis are left somewhat vague. RTA, like cost-benefit
analysis, could take many forms, ranging from a simple off-the-cuff esti-
mate to a carefully detailed analysis of each and every possible implication
of regulatory action.
Although innately appealing, RTA may create unwise decisionmaking.
Whenever a new analysis is required before regulating, the administrative
system clogs and action becomes much more difficult. Donald Hornstein
warns of "super-synopticism," which requires exhaustively full information
on all aspects of any problem before taking action.' Such full information
ultimately is never available, and regulated industries can be counted upon
continually to raise additional questions that demand answers. 8 The quest
for synoptic comprehension produces "paralysis by analysis." William
Rodgers warned that the "insatiable pursuit of data also facilitates delay and
the avoidance of controversy; any decision dependent upon extensive data-
gathering promises to be long in incubation and short on results and contro-
versy."359 Graham and Wiener acknowledge this risk of RTA, noting that
one must decide upon "the value of more information (to better decisions)
and the cost (including delay of decisions)." 3
Public health decisionmaking cannot become unduly preoccupied with
the risks of regulation. Doing so would replace the risks of action with
those of inaction. The precautionary principle has been misapplied to
environmental risks but should not be conversely misapplied to risks of
government action. The goal should be better regulation, not zero regula-
tion." ' Consequently, any rigid, new, comprehensive analytical require-
357. Donald T. Hornstein, Lessons from Federal Pesticide Regulation on the Paradigms
and Politics of Environmental Law Reform, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 386 (1993). Else-
where Hornstein argues that "synoptic ideals impose informational and analytical burdens
that make effective government intervention impossible." Donald T. Hornstein, Paradigms,
Process, and Politics: Risk and Regulatory Design, in WORST TI-INGS FIRST?, supra note
123, at 158.
358. See CROSS, supra note 47, at 89 (1989) (observing that cost-benefit analysis
requirements permitted "a delaying strategy by industry or other opponents of carcinogen
regulation"); David C. Vladeck & Thomas 0. McGarity, Paralysis by Analysis: How
Conservatives Plan To Kill Popular Regulation, AM. PROSPECT, Summer 1995, at 78
(arguing that seemingly neutral procedural requirements for regulation are nothing more than
beard for bias against any regulation).
359. William Rodgers, Benefits, Costs, and Risks: Oversight of Health and Environmen-
tal Decisionmaking, 4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 191, 200 (1980); see also Thomas 0.
McGarity, Regulatory Analysis and Regulatory Reform, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1243, 1302-03
(1987) (pointing out inherent "tension between timeliness and analysis").
360. GRAHAM & WIENER, supra note 49, at 21.
361. If risk trade-off analysis is captured by antiregulatory interests, it will lose credibil-
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ments are to be avoided. Yet some additional analysis is obviously required
if regulations are not to do more harm than good.
One promising approach to avoid counterproductive risks of regulation
is to focus regulation on truly significant risks. This aligns the avoidance
of regulatory risks with the comparative risk movement, which has already
made headway in government agencies .362 When the government regulates
significant risks, the regulation may well create its own risks, but the
government-created risks are less likely to exceed the regulated risk. How-
ever, when "the expected returns from the safety features demanded are so
tiny," people will "end up much less safe."363
While comparative risk analysis and elimination of reliance on the
precautionary principle reduces the probability of counterproductive regu-
latory action, there remains a prospect of perverse consequences. Indeed,
it is possible that a focus on the greatest risks might also cause the greatest
adverse consequences. Analysis of risk trade-offs is currently quite rare.
64
Hence, there is a need for some measure of RTA, as advocated by Graham
and Wiener, even after prioritizing attention toward the greatest risks.
The requirements of RTA should not become too rigid. Regulating
agencies should consider the most obvious risks of action, such as probable
substitutes, known foregone benefits, and direct risks from remediation.
A closely detailed analysis is probably unnecessary, insofar as the by-
product risks are inevitably somewhat speculative. The agencies should be
given authority to consider these offsetting risks and a directive to at least
ity, much as health/health analysis has suffered. See Cross, supra note 52, at 744-45
(reporting how consideration of health effects of economic costs of regulations has been
demeaned in Congress as merely excuse for agenda of interests desirous of preventing any
regulation). RTA must be structured and presented as regulatory improvement, not regula-
tory relief.
362. See supra note 300 and accompanying text (discussing comparative risk movement,
particularly within EPA).
363. Nathwani & Narveson, supra note 130, at 616.
364. The EPA's analysis of chlorine regulation is remarkable because it has at least
considered the relative safety of chlorine substitutes. See Graham, supra note 299, at 22.
Such consideration is the exception. Graham observes that:
Congress needs to mandate consideration of risk trade-offs because agencies
sometimes have incentives to downplay risks that are being induced by their
policies. For example, in the 1980s the National High Traffic Safety Administra-
tion refused to acknowledge that automobile fuel economy rules were decreasing
occupant safety by encouraging vehicle manufacturers to build smaller and lighter
cars. NHTSA is beginning to acknowledge this competing risk but only reluc-
tantly following a court order.
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consider the magnitude of the risks before regulating. Had government
institutions acted deliberately in response to the indoor asbestos scare,
rather than responding in a panic, the risk created by removal might well
have been avoided. 65
A simple form of RTA should be employed by agencies, whenever
authorized. In the course of this RTA, agencies should consider the exis-
tence of countervailing risks from the most obvious sources, as described
above. No precise algorithm should be compelled; agencies should con-
sider the risks on a case by case basis. Judicial review of agency decisions
should be correspondingly limited to egregious failure to consider risky
consequences of action.3" ExCessive analytic requirements or judicial
second-guessing will only muck up the system. One must rely to some
measure upon the good faith of agencies (constrained by public comments
and attendant risks of publicity) in order to act beneficially. Clearly,
however, the unexamined precautionary principle is an insufficient basis for
regulatory action.
IV. Conclusion
The precautionary principle rests upon an illusion that actions have no
consequences beyond their intended ends. In fact, there is no such thing
as a risk-free lunch. Efforts to eliminate any given risk will create some
new risks, while possibly reducing other ancillary risks. 6 If one's intent
365. See Cross, supra note 245, at 88-94 (observing that risks of removal were known,
but were temporarily ignored in response to public demands for precautionary action).
366. See GRAHAM &WIENER, supra note 49, at263 (suggesting that some court review
is essential to prevent agencies from neglecting countervailing risks and to "help instill in
agencies diligent attention to risk trade-offs"). Yet Graham and Wiener concede that the
"courts have not.., been a reliable source of leadership for more intelligent management
of society's risk portfolio." Id. at 260. One may hope for some self-restraint from courts
themselves. Cf. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1222 (5th Cir. 1991)
(declaring that EPA must show "reasonable relationship" between costs and benefits of
regulation but need not prepare "an exhaustive, full-scale, cost-benefit analysis").
367. Policymakers must appreciate that action may have unforeseen benefits as well as
risks. Graham and Wiener suggest that these coincidental risk reductions are likely to be
far less common than countervailing risk increases, due to the characteristics of agencies.
GRAHAM & WIENER, supra note 49, at 232-33. While this is probably true, there are some
obvious instances where coincidental ancillary risk reductions may be substantial and should
be considered. For example, actions taken to reduce coal-fired generation in the interest of
combatting global warming could produce a substantial ancillary health benefit from
reduction in airborne particulates and occupational fatalities. As discussed above, a shift
from coal to nuclear power would produce substantial health benefit. See supra notes 62-77
dnd accompanying text (discussing serious environmental and health problems posed by coal
and calculating benefits of switching to nuclear power).
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is truly to protect public health and the environment, all of these incidental
risks must be considered, contrary to prevailing applications of the precau-
tionary principle.
The objective of this Article is to demonstrate how frequently counter-
vailing risks can arise from well-intended programs aimed at risk reduction.
The reader may object that my examples are selectively chosen. In fact, I
have not sought to demonstrate that every environmental program is coun-
terproductive, because many are not. For example, I believe that the pre-
vailing ambient air quality standards have been net beneficial. The body
of this Article does present a large number of cases of counterproductive
action, including some of the government's most prominent environmental
policies. The number and significance of these examples should be suffi-
cient to command attention and response.
Other readers may dispute the claims of my specific cases and contend,
for example, that nuclear power is more hazardous than fossil fuel-fired
generation of electricity or energy conservation. No intellectually honest
person could profess to have the dispositive truth about such a question.
My thesis is not dependent upon the facts of any particular example, how-
ever. Indeed, one who opposes my nuclear power example on the facts
implicitly concedes the existence of trade-offs and a measure of uncertainty
about their magnitude. This is all I need to establish in order to delegiti-
mate the precautionary principle.
Rhetorically, the precautionary principle may prove quite useful to
advocates of one particular policy or another. Pragmatically, the principle
is destructive, even self-destructive. Protecting public health requires rec-
ognition of the consequentialist complexity of regulatory action. Simplistic
rhetorical devices cannot account for this complexity. Environmental pro-
tection requires a more thoughtful response.
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